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D

INTRODUCTION

uring the twentieth century,1 acquisition of liability insurance 2
expanded rapidly so that' today it is one of the most common

1. Agreements that transfer risks incident to various types of tort claims by
third parties are a relatively new form of insurance contract. For example, liability
insurance for business firms was introduced in the United States around 1890. At
that time, employers sought to arrange indemnification for tort claims asserted by
injured employees. See S.S.

HUEBNER ET AL.,

PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE

353 (3d ed. 1982) (discussing introduction of liability insurance in United States);
see also ALBERT H. MOWBRAv ET AL., INSURANCE 232-34 (6th ed. 1969) (discussing
introduction of liability insurance in England). Liability insurance for motorists
became available as use of automobiles rapidly expanded in the early years of the
twentieth century. In general, the acquisition of various types of liability coverage
has accompanied urbanization and increasing levels of commercial activity in the
United States.
2. Liability insurance is a contractual arrangement obligating an insurer to
provide indemnification for sums that an insured may become legally obligated to
pay to a third party as damages resulting from a type of occurrence that is among
the risks identified in the terms of the contract. In liability insurance policies, an
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forms of coverage in the United States.3 Billions of dollars are
spent by businesses and individuals to purchase coverage for risks
incident to the use or ownership of property, the operation of motor vehicles, and the pursuit of various business and professional
activities. Similarly, enterprises throughout the country acquire liability insurance to transfer at least some portion of the risks associated with the fabrication, distribution and use of manufactured or
processed products in order to secure protection for insureds in
the event tort claims are asserted as a result of defective products
that have caused injuries.
Every year, thousands of legal actions for damages are initiated
against entities or individuals covered by liability insurance. Sometimes law suits asserting tort claims against insureds result in awards
of punitive 4 damages, as well as compensatory damages. 5 Such
"occurrence" is typically described or defined as an accident that causes injury to
the person or property of a third party. In some insurance policies, the term "occurrence" is characterized as "an act or an omission."
3. The breadth and diversity of various types of liability insurance are indicated by an abridged list of coverage types currently available, which include:
(1) accountants' liability; (2) advertising liability; (3) architects' liability; (4) comprehensive general liability; (5) contractors' liability; (6) contractual liability exposure; (7) dentists' professional liability; (8) fiduciary liability; (9) hospital liability;
(10) homeowners' liability; (11) lawyers' professional liability; (12) liquor liability;
(13) physicians' and surgeons' professional liability; (14) pollution liability;
(15) store keepers' liability; and (16) products liability.
4. Punitive damages are also frequently referred to as exemplary damages. In
the United States, courts may award punitive damages when the tortious conduct
was intentional, malicious, reckless, wanton or particularly oppressive. Judges use
phrases such as a "wanton disregard of the consequences," "outrageous behavior"
and "wilful neglect" to describe the types of circumstances that justify an award of
punitive damages. See 7 JOHN A. APPLEMAN &JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4312 (Buckley ed. 1979) (discussing appropriateness of punitive damages when tortfeasor is guilty of wilful and wanton conduct); JAMES D. GHLARni &
JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.01 (1985) (discussing
cases where courts have awarded punitive damages).
Ancient legal codes provided for punitive damages. For example, section 107
of the Code of Hammurabi states:
If the principal has overcharged the agent and the agent has really returned to his principal whatever his principal gave him, and if the principal has disputed what the agent has given him, that agent shall put his
principal on oath before the elders, and the merchant, because he has
defrauded the agent, shall pay to the agent sixfold what he misappropriated.
C.H.W. JOHNS, BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN LAWS, CONTRACTS AND LETTERS 51 (1904)
(emphasis added); see alsoJ.M. PowIs SMITH, THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF HEBREW
LAW 246 (1960) (discussing Hittite laws).
5. In 1882, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished between compensatory
and punitive damages:
Compensatory damages are as such as arise from actual and indirect pecuniary loss, mental suffering, value of time, actual expenses, and to those
may be added bodily pain and suffering. Exemplary, vindictive, or punitory damages are such as blend together the interests of society and of the
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awards have produced disputes concerning whether liability insurance indemnifies insureds for such damages. 6
There are hundreds of judicial decisions each year resolving
disagreements between insurers and insureds concerning the scope
of coverage provided by insurance arrangements involving many
different types of insurance policies and coverage issues. Frequently, courts decide questions about an insurer's obligation in
accordance with doctrines or rules that result in interpreting policy
terms to extend coverage. 7 However, when coverage issues involve
8
punitive damages, there are conflicting public interests involved,
including some that offset the general disposition of courts to apply
an approach that sustains an insured's claim. 9
aggrieved individual, and are not only a recompense to the sufferer but a
punishment to the offender and an example to the community.
Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117, 121 (1882); see also Kress & Co. v. Powell, 180 So. 757,
763 (Fla. 1938) (quoting with approval, Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117, 121 (1882)).
6. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages,
56 S.CAL.L. Rv. 1, 12-20 (1982) (discussing cases that analyze whether insurance
companies may provide coverage for punitive damages); George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1009, 1011-18 (1989) (same); Paul D.
Seyferth, The Construction and Admissibility of InsurancePolicies That Provide Coverage
for PunitiveDamageAwards, 7 ALASKA L. REv. 71, 77-82 (1990) (same); Theodore D.
Fischer, Comment, Insurance Coverage and the Punitive Award in the Automobile Accident Suit, 19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 144, 144-53 (1957) (same); Michael A. Rosenhouse,
Annotation, Liability Insurance Coverage As Extending to Liabilityfor Punitive or Exemplary Damages, 16 A.L.R.4TH 11, 11-47 (1982) (same).
7. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDIss, INSURANCE LAw: A GUIDE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 341-439
(1988) (discussing various rights against insurers that are at variance with insurance policy provisions). For a discussion of whether punitive damages are within
an insured's reasonable expectation of coverage, see infranotes 46-47 and accompanying text.
8. Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co. of N.C., 319 S.E.2d 217, 221 (N.C. 1984). In
Mazza v. Medical Mutual Insurance Co. of North Carolina., the North Carolina
Supreme Court observed:
Medical Mutual, in advancing its "public policy" argument, seems to ignore the proposition that the concept of "public policy" involves not one
simplistic rule, but various competing doctrines. In this case, the law of
contractsand the "public policy" doctrines encompassing that body of law, compete
with the defendant's tort related "public policy" argument.
Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the court, after noting that "the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that
public policy did not prevent indemnity for punitive damages," observed:
This state has more than one public policy. Another and countervailing
public policy favors freedom of contract, in the absence of overriding
reasons for depriving the parties of that freedom. Still another public
policy favors the enforcement of insurance contracts according to their
terms, where the insurance company accepts the premium and reasonably represents or implies that coverage is provided.
17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1993).
9. For example, the authors of one of the encyclopedias on insurance law set
forth the view: "The better position is that, absent specific language in the policy
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Litigation about the insurability of punitive damages has occurred for most of this century so that there is now a substantial
body of judicial precedents. More recently, several states have
adopted legislation that addresses this issue. 10 In addition, some
insurers include provisions in liability insurance policies that explicitly specify whether coverage is or is not provided for punitive damages. 'Therefore, today, in determining an insured's right to
indemnification when punitive damages are awarded to a claimant,
it is essential to consider:
(1) whether coverage afforded by an otherwise applicable
liability insurance policy is precluded because the
award is the result of injuries that were caused by an
insured's intentional tortious act and the insured's right
to indemnification is excluded by either an explicit
provision in the insurance policy or an implied exception that has been recognized by the courts;
(2) whether there is a provision in the otherwise applicable insurance policy which explicitly excludes coverage for punitive damages;
(3) whether a court will impose a coverage restriction
based on public policy that precludes coverage for punitive damages either generally or for some specific
situations;
(4) whether state legislation imposes a restriction on coverage for punitive damages generally or for specific
situations;
(5) the type of conduct (an intentional act, gross negligence, reckless/wanton, or outrageous conduct, etc.)
that provided the basis for an award of punitive damages; and
(6) whether liability resulted from an action of the insured that directly caused the injuries or is derivative
extending coverage for punitive damages, no coverage exists for such damages as it
is against public policy to allow the insured wrongdoer to shift the burden of payment of punitives to its insurer." GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 56:9 (Mark S. Rhodes ed., 2d ed. 1985).
10. Consequently, issues concerning whether insurance companies may provide coverage for punitive damages may be determined by: (1) legislation that
enunciates the state's public policy, establishing prohibitions or prescribing restrictive parameters; (2) judicial opinions concerning the relative importance of various public interests or (3) provisions in the applicable insurance policy. For a
discussion of legislation and cases that specify the public policies of various states,
see infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39: p. 455

(as, for example, when a claim against the insured is
based on vicarious liability).
Each of these possibilities is examined in Part II or Part III of
this Article, which surveys judicial and legislative responses to disputes about whether punitive damages are insurable. In Part IV,
the focus shifts to an analysis of actions by some state legislators and
insurers to exclude coverage for punitive damages. The material in
Parts II and III also provides the framework for an Addendum that
analyzes the justifications for allowing liability insurance to provide
coverage for punitive damages when a claimant's injuries result
from defective products.II.

A.

LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 1 1

Express and Implied Restrictions on Coveragefor Intentional Acts

Insurance contracts1 2 generally do not provide indemnification when an occurrence is not fortuitous.1 3 This proposition is
widely viewed as a fundamental principle of insurance. 14 Even
though it is not an immutable rule that liability insurance does not
11. Virtually all insurance arrangements are subject to some restrictions on
the risks that are transferred from the insured to the insurer. Insurance policies
often specify limitations in qualifying phrases or clauses included in the basic
coverage statements. In addition, insurance policies often contain restrictions that
appear under headings such as "conditions," "definitions," "exclusions" or
"exceptions." Further, other restrictions commonly apply to insurance coverage as
a result of legislative actions or judicial decisions. For a discussion of restrictions
on insurance coverage imposed by legislative and judicial action, see infra notes 2732 and accompanying text.
When courts award punitive damages as the result of a tortious act, liability
insurance coverage may be unavailable because: (1) there are terms in the
applicable insurance policy setting forth an exclusion for punitive damages;
(2) legislative provisions prohibit such coverage; or (3) such coverage violates state
public policy established by judicial decision. For a discussion of express and
implied restrictions on liability insurance coverage for injuries resulting from
intentional acts, see infra notes 12-26 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
insurance policy provisions that explicitly preclude coverage for punitive damages,
see infra note 28 and accompanying text. For a discussion of restrictions on
coverage for punitive damages imposed by state legislatures, see infra note 29 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of judicially implied restrictions on coverage
for punitive damages, see infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
12. Insurance coverage terms and conditions are usually set forth in a document referred to as an "insurance policy."
13. Fortuity, or the lack thereof, is primarily a matter of intent. Accordingly,
it is important to remember that in insurance law, as in tort law, questions about
intent generally focus on consequences, not acts. KEETON & WInIss, supra note 7,
§ 5.3(a), at 116.
14. The principle that insurance should only be employed to transfer risks
associated with fortuitous occurrences means that in most circumstances liability
coverage does not apply when injuries are the result of an intentional tortious act.
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afford indemnification when damages result from an intentional
tortious act, 15 in most circumstances it is contrary to public policy
for a liability insurance contract to provide coverage when losses
are not fortuitous.' 6 Accordingly, coverage for punitive damages
awarded against insureds who have intentionally caused injuries
may be foreclosed by either express provisions in the insurance
contract 17 or implied' 8 restrictions that are imposed by courts.
1. Express Provisions Excluding Coverage for Intentional Acts of
an Insured
Insurance policies usually set forth terms specifying that coverage is not provided for intentionally caused harms in one or more
of several types of provisions that are included in.
such contract
forms. Frequently, there is a clause in the basic description of the
coverage stating that the insurer will only pay damages for which an
insured (or, in many of the newer forms, a "covered person") becomes legally responsible because of an accident.19 Insurers also em15. The proposition that insurance arrangements should be limited to the
transfer of economic detriments that are fortuitous is commonly regarded as a
basic principle of insurance law. However, there are situations in which insurance
companies pay benefits even though the loss resulted from an intentional act. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 7, § 5.4(d)(7), at 116 (discussing professional liability
coverage for intentional acts).
16. See, e.g., Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbor Club, 549 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla.
1989) ("It is axiomatic in the insurance industry that one should not be able to

insure against one's own intentional misconduct."); see also RICHARDS

ON THE LAW

§ 1.13 ( Warren Freedman ed., 6th ed. 1990) ("It is universally recognized that an implied exception to coverage under any form of insurance is an
intentional or expected injury, damage or loss. Insurance, by its very definition,
covers injury, damage or loss which is fortuitous and not within the control of the
insurer or the insured."); COUCH, supra note 9, § 39.15 ("It is generally held to be
contrary to public policy to insure against liability arising directly against the insured form his wilful wrong. Any insurance which purports to protect the insured
against any loss which he may purposely and wilfully cause, or which may arise
from his immoral, fraudulent, or felonious conduct, is void as against public
policy.").
17. Liability insurance policies usually include explicit coverage limitations in
the insurance contract specifying that losses that are intentionally caused by an
insured are not covered. See COUCH, supra note 9, § 39.15 ("Any insurance which
purports to protect the insured against any loss which he may purposely and
wilfully cause, or which may arise form his immoral, fraudulent, or felonious conduct, is void as against public policy."). For a complete discussion of these provisions, see infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
18. Even when there is no express provision, coverage may be excluded by a
judicially recognized implied exception when an insured commits an intentional
tort. For a complete discussion of this issue, see infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
OF INSURANCE

19. See, e.g., COMMERCIAL LIABILrIY INSURANCE (1993) (reprinting insurance
forms); FIRE, CASUALTY AND SURvT FoRMs (1993) (same); see also Ronald J.
Wendorff, The New Standard Comprehensive General Liability. Insurance Policy, 1966
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ploy provisions defining various terms in insurance policies to
specify that coverage is not provided for intentional torts. For example, many contemporary liability insurance policies state that
coverage is provided for an "occurrence" that "results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." 20 Furthermore, liability insurance policies
frequently include exclusions that explicitly preclude coverage for
an "injury... caused intentionally."2 1 Such provisions are in accord
with the doctrine, frequently reiterated by judges, that public policy
prohibits the use of insurance to provide indemnification for civil
tort liability that results from an insured's intentional wrongdoing.
If an insured's intentional tortious conduct warrants a denial of coverage on the basis of explicit provisions in liability insurance policies, it follows that coverage for punitive damages awarded as a
consequence of such acts also is not within the scope of the protec22
tion afforded by liability insurance.

A.B.A. SEC. OF INS., NEGLIGENCE & COMPENSATION L. PRoc. 250, 252-54 (discussing
policy provisions that attempt to limit coverage to "accidents"); Annotation, Liability Insurance: Assault as an "Accident," or Injuries Therefrom as "Accidentally"Sustained,
Within Coverage Clause, 72 A.L.R.3D 1090 (1976) (same).
20. Many contemporary insurance policies provide coverage that is neither
expected nor "intended from the standpoint of the insured." The insurance industry began using this phrase in policies providing general liability coverage for
liability in 1966, after completing revisions to insurance forms that the industry
had used since 1940. See Millard Warehouse, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 283
N.W.2d 56, 61 (Neb. 1979) (interpreting insurance policy that limited coverage to
accidents "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured"); see
also Donald F. Farbstein & Francis J. Sillman, Insurancefor the Commission of Intentional Torts, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1219, 1222-28 (1969) (discussing "intentional injury
exclusion"); Linda J. Kibler, Note, Intentional Injury Exclusionary Clauses: The Question of Ambiguity, 21 VAL. U. L. REv. 361, 377 (1987) (noting that "the purpose of
the intentional injury exclusion clause is to prevent extending to the insured a
license to commit wanton and malicious acts"). Prior to 1966, most insurance contracts used similar language that provided an "exclusion" for "bodily injury or
property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured." PatronsOxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge 426 A.2d 888, 890 (Me. 1988) (interpreting pre1966 insurance policy).
21. See W.E. Merritt III, Annotation, Liability Insurance: Specific Exclusion of
Liabilityfor Injury Intentionally Caused By Insured, 2 A.L.R.3D 1238, 1238-53 (1965);
see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8 (5th
ed. 1984) (defining intentional torts and providing a general discussion of liability
for such torts); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 7, § 5.4, at 116 (same).
22. Cf Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) ("[I]t seems only
just that the burden of paying punitive damages should rest ultimately, as well as
nominally, on the party who actually committed the wrong. If the defendant...
was permitted to shift ... the burden of the punitive damage award, then the
award would have served no purpose.").
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Implied Exceptions Excluding Liability.Insurance Coveragefor
IntentionalActs

Even if there is no provision in a liability insurance policy that
expressly excludes coverage for damages resulting from an insured's intentional act, an implied exception may exclude such coverage. The phrase "implied exception" describes the situation in
which an insurer's denial of insurance coverage is not based on any
specific language in the insurance contract. 23 The public interest
in discouraging intentional misconduct is sufficiently important
that some courts have implied coverage restrictions 24 when a tor23. Examples of other implied exceptions that are widely recognized for insurance coverage include the rules that sustain denials of recovery under fire insurance for losses caused by "friendly fires" and under marine insurance for losses
caused by ordinary deterioration of goods. See KEETON & WIDIss, supra note 7,
§ 5.3, at 116. The concept of fortuity that is relevant to an application of an implied exception-when there is no express limitation set forth in the applicable
insurance policy-almost always involves an analysis of whether an individual intended the consequences that resulted in a claim for insurance coverage.
24. A survey of selected states provides insights into such coverage
restrictions:
Alabama: St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Talladega Nursing Home, Inc., 606 F.2d 631, 632
(5th Cir. 1979) (following Alabama law and holding that "all contracts insuring
against loss from intentional wrongs are void as against public policy").
Calfornia Section 533 of the California Insurance Code provides: "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured; but he is not
exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agents or others."
CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993). Courts have interpreted this section as precluding insurance coverage for punitive damages and finding an implied exclusionary
clause that should be read into all insurance policies. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 205 Cal. Rptr. 460, 464 (Ct. App.
1984) (noting that California Insurance Code section 533 reflects "longstanding
public policy ... which disapproves of contracts which directly or indirectly exempt anyone from personal responsibility for his (or her] own wilful injury to another") (quotations omitted); City Prod. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 151 Cal. Rptr.
494, 496-501 (Ct. App. 1979) (concluding that recovery of punitive damages under
a general liability policy for malicious act of corporate official was prohibited by
California Insurance Code section 533). The court in City Products Corp. v. Globe
Indemnity Co. stated that the policy of the State of California is "that punitive damages may be recovered only 'for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendant' and thereby precluding passing them on to an insurer." City Products,
151 Cal. Rptr. at 496 (quotations omitted).
District of Columbia: Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Title Guar. Co., 520 F.2d 1170,
1175 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that it is against public policy for "knowledgeable
and intentional wrongdoer" to insure against his or her actions).
Florida: Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbor Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla.
1989) (stating that it is "axiomatic" within insurance industry that one should not
be able to insure against one's intentional misconduct).
Kansas American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 525-27 (10th Cir. 1966)
(predicting that insurance coverage for punitive damages under Kansas law would
be against public policy because such coverage would permit individuals to insure
themselves against wanton and willful acts).
North Dakota: Haser v. Maryland Casualty Co., 53 N.W.2d 508, 512 (N.D. 1952)
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tious act is not fortuitous from the point of view of the insured. 25
The fact that an intentional tort usually involves one or more acts
that also constitute transgressions of the criminal laws provides substantial additional support for the proposition that the protection
afforded by liability insurance is appropriately subject to ajudicially
imposed restriction even when no exclusion is specified in the coverage terms.2 6 In circumstance in which judicial evaluations of the
public interest would result in an implied coverage limitation for
damages resulting from an intentional tort, it follows that courts
would also conclude that no liability insurance coverage exists for
punitive, as well as compensatory, damages.
B.

Insurance Policy Provisions That Preclude Coverage
for Punitive Damages

The policy forms used by some insurers for liability insurance
include clauses specifying that no coverage exists for punitive damages. The applicable provisions limiting coverage are often unmistakably clear and unambiguous: "This insurance does not apply
under Coverage A to ... [p]unitive or exemplary damages or any
fine, penalty or claim for return of fees."27 Courts have sustained
("[T]o indemnify insured against his own violation of the law is void against public
policy.").
Ohio- Wedge Prod. v. Hartford Equity Sales Co., 509 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ohio
1987) ("[P]ublic policy is contrary to insurance against intentional torts.").
Oregon: Isenhart v. General Casualty Co. of Am., 377 P.2d 26, 27 (Or. 1962)
(noting that it is contrary to Oregon public policy to permit insurance coverage for
intentional acts); see also Cunningham & Walsh, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 744
P.2d 1317, 1318-20 (Or. Ct. App. 1987). ("[T]o provide coverage for fraud would
violate public policy.").
Only a few cases have permitted an implied exception for intentional acts, in
part, because of the fact that liability policies almost uniformly include express
requirements that coverage is provided for injuries "caused by accident" only. In
addition, the general rule that insurance coverage for intentional acts violates public policy is so firmly established that it would ordinarily go unchallenged even. if
there were no insurance policy clause directly in point.
25. For a discussion of the appropriate point of view for considering whether
loss is fortuitous, see KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 7, § 5.4(c), at 116. Note that
when a state's financial responsibility statute is viewed as mandating liability coverage for accident victims, courts have sometimes concluded that even in cases of
intentional torts by motorists, the public interest is served by allowing an innocent
victim of an intentional tortfeasor to recover from the tortfeasor's liability insurance. Id. § 5.4(d)(3).
26. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated, "[w]ere a person able to insure
himself against the economic consequences of wrongdoing, the deterrence attributable to financial responsibility would be missing." Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes,
388 A.2d 603, 606 (NJ. 1978).
27. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Kinsey, 499 N.W.2d 574, 577 (N.D. 1993)
(discussing potential ambiguity of coverage provision concerning punitive damages). In other insurance policies, the terms that describe, limit or restrict the
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the enforceability of such provisions.2 8
C.

Legislatively Imposed Restrictions on Coverage for Punitive Damages

One or two states have resolved some of the issues concerning
whether insurance coverage extends to punitive damages by adopting legislation that prohibits such coverage. For example, in Ohio
the Insurance Code provisions regulating motor vehicle insurance
state: "No policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance . . .
shall provide coveragefor judgments or claims against an insuredfor puni29
tive or exemplary damages."
D. Judicially Implied Restrictions on Coveragefor Punitive Damages
Sometimes punitive damages are awarded in a judgment
against an insured and liability coverage is not precluded by any
restriction, express or implied, for intentional tortious acts nor by
an explicit provision in the insurance policy excluding coverage for
punitive damages. In such instances, courts have been called upon
to decide whether public interest warrants the application of an implied exception eliminating coverage for punitive damages. There
coverage of punitive damages often are not as explicit and unequivocal. For example, in a South Dakota case the insurance policy stated that it "promise [d] to pay
damages for bodily injury or property damage for which the law holds [the insured]
responsible." Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Wyant, 474 N.W.2d 514, 515 (S.D. 1991); accord
Cavin's, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 220 S.E.2d 403, 406 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975)
(noting that policy provided protection for all "sums" insured was legally obligated
to pay as damages).
28. See, e.g., International Ins. Co.v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 780 F. Supp. 546,
552-53 (N.D. Ill. 1991), vacated, 994 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1993). In International
Insurance Co. v. Guaranty National Insurance Co., the court stated that punitive damages "are not compensation for injury." Id. The court noted instead that punitive
damages are "private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct
and to deter its future occurrence." Id.; see also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers
v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979) (noting that punitive damages are punishment,
not compensation); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hempstead, 397 N.E.2d
737, 741 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that liability insurance coverage for punitive damages awards that might be made pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 would be
against public policy). Accordingly, punitive damages are not covered when a policy excludes fines. See Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432,
436 (5th Cir. 1962) (discussing Florida and Virginia public policy concerning coverage for punitive damages); American Home Assurance Co.v. Fish, 451 A.2d 358,
360 (N.H. 1982) (discussing whether insurance policy covered punitive damages
resulting from intentional torts); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908
(1977) (discussing, generally, punitive damages and criticisms of punitive
damages).

29. 39

OHIo REv. CODE ANN.

§ 3937.18.2(B) (Anderson 1988) (emphasis ad-

ded). But cf. Federal Ins. Co. v. National Distrib. Co., Inc., 417 S.E.2d 671, 675
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that statutory provisions requiring that courts only
award punitive damages to punish defendants did not imply that punitive damages
were against public policy).
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is a clear split among judicial precedents about whether an otherwise applicable liability insurance policy does (or should) provide
coverage for punitive damages. Arguments in support of the view
that liability insurance should not provide such coverage emphasize
that an award of punitive damages is primarily intended either to
punish the wrongdoer or to deter similar conduct by the wrongdoer and others in the future. Therefore, to allow an insured to
shift the responsibility for punitive damages to an insurer would
thwart the public interests in attaining punishment and deterrence.3 0 Courts in many states agree with the view that persons
should not be permitted to insure against harms they "intentionally
and unlawfully cause others, and thereby acquire a license to engage in such activity."31 Thus, there are numerous judicial precedents stating that liability insurance may not provide coverage for
32
punitive damages because such coverage violates public policy.
30. See American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 525-27 (10th Cir. 1965) (predicting that Kansas public policy prohibits insurance coverage for wanton, intentional acts). Some courts and commentators have stated that punitive damages
should not be covered by liability insurance because the public would bear the
ultimate burden through subsequent premium increases. See Northwestern, 307
F.2d at 440-41 (observing that added liability would be passed along to the premium payers and that ultimately society would be "punishing itself for the wrong
committed by the insured"); see also Charles M. Lauderback, Note, The Exclusion
Clause: A Simple and GenuineSolution to the Insurancefor PunitiveDamages Controversy,
12 U.S.F. L. REv. 743, 748 (1978) (discussing various public policy reasons against
allowing insurance coverage for punitive damages).
31. Home Ins. Co. v. Nensen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (N.D. Ill. 1975), quoted in
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 92, 95 (N.D.
Ind. 1976).
32. A review of selected jurisdictions provides support for the position that
insurance coverage for punitive damages violates public policy:
United States- Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 282 (4th Cir.
1987) (noting that Florida and Illinois public policy prohibits insurance for punitive damages awarded as a result of an individual's own misconduct); cf. Union L.P.
Gas Sys., Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (8th
Cir. 1989) (interpreting excess policy to exclude coverage of punitive damages).
California: Peterson v. Superior Court, 642 P.2d 1305, 1311 (Cal. 1982) (stating that California's rule against the indemnification of punitive damages by insurance is based on the public policy rationale "against diluting the deterrent effect of
punitive damages by allowing the impact of the penalty to be shifted to the insurer"); see also City Prod. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 151 Cal. Rptr. 494, 496 (Ct.
App. 1979) (discussing public policy against allowing insurance coverage for punitive damages); cf Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Pacific S.W. Airlines, 786 F. Supp. 867, 869 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (applying California law and
discussing public policy underlying section 533 of California Insurance Code).
Coloradx Gleason v. Fryer, 491 P.2d 85, 86 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) ("Under the
rule in Universal Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Tenery,supra, Safeco cannot be held
responsible for Fryer's liability for punitive damages."); Brown v. Western Casualty
& Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (concluding that insurance
policy excluded exemplary damages); cf. Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 39
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P.2d 776, 779 (Colo. 1934) (stating that insurer is not liable for insured's "wrong
against the public").

Connecticut: See Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 18 A.2d 357, 359 (Conn.

1941) (stating that "a policy which expressly covered an obligation of an insured
to pay a sum of money in no way representing injuries or losses suffered by the
plaintiff but imposed as a penalty because of a public wrong" would "certainly be
against public policy"); see also American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257, 26162 (D. Conn. 1965) (discussing Connecticut public policy against allowing coverage for punitive damages).
Florida: See U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983)
(noting that although Florida public policy prohibits liability insurance coverage
for punitive damages assessed against person for his or her own wrongful acts, it
does not preclude insurance coverage for punitive damages when the insured is
vicariously liable for another's wrong); Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898,
900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (holding that assault and battery by employee was accident
within meaning of insurance contract and therefore policy covered resulting punitive damages), cert. denied, 194 So. 2d 622 (1966); Nicholson v. American Fire &
Casualty Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (agreeing with view,
set forth in McNulty by Fifth Circuit, that in Florida "as a matter of public policy
punitive damages .. . are based on a theory inconsistent with their coverage by
liability insurance") (citation omitted); see also Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 655
F.2d 650, 659 (5th Cir. 1981)("The basic rule of Florida law is that public policy
forbids insurance coverage of punitive damages in order that the punitive and
deterrent purposes of these damages will not be thwarted. Florida's intermediate
appellate courts, however, have permitted insurance coverage of punitive damages
where the insured party was not itself at fault but was merely vicariously liable for
punitive damages based on the reckless conduct of another.") (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
Illinois. Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1060 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) ("Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he gains a
freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanctions against
such misconduct.... And, there is no point in punishing the insurance company;
it has done no wrong.") (quotations omitted); see also U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Beltmann N. Am. Co., 695 F. Supp. 941, 947-50 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ( noting that under
Illinois insurance law, public policy prohibits insurance coverage for punitive damages), rev'd on other grounds, 883 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1989).
Kansas- GuaranteeAbstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 618
P.2d 1195, 1198 (Kan. 1980) (stating that public policy demands that payment of
punitive damage awards rests on party who committed the wrong, rather than insurer); see also Gold"375 F.2d at 535-37 (holding that Kansas public policy prohibits
insurance coverage for punitive damages). Effective in 1984, section 40-2,115 of
Kansas statutory code stated that it is not against public policy for a person to
obtain insurance covering punitive damages resulting from intentional acts. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-2,115 (1993); see also Golf Course Superintendents Ass'n v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 761 F. Supp. 1485, 1491 (D. Kan. 1991) (noting that
section 40-2,115 states that insurance coverage for punitive damages is not against
public policy).
Louisiana: Cf Dubois v. Arkansas Valley Dredging Co., 651 F. Supp. 299, 30203 (W.D. La. 1987) (applying general maritime law and holding that public policy
prohibits insurance coverage for punitive damages).
Missouri: Heartland Stores, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 815 S.W.2d 39, 42-43 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that business comprehensive insurance policy did not
cover punitive damages because such damages are not within definition of "personal injury"); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (holding that
"to allow a motorist to insure himself against judgments imposed against him for
punitive damages, which were assessed against him for his wanton, reckless or willful acts, would be contrary to public policy").
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Nevada: New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Gruhn, 670 P.2d 941, 943 (Nev. 1983)
(per curiam) ("[I]t is incumbent upon the party whose conduct was so outrageous
as to merit punishment by means of punitive damages to bear the burden of paying the award. Only then will the goal of punishment and deterrence be effectuated. This policy would be thwarted if the tortfeasor is able to skirt the award by
passing the liability on to a surety.").
New Jersey: Variety Farms, Inc. v. NewJersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 410 A.2d 696, 703
(N.J. 1980) ("We consider the sounder rule to be that public policy does not permit a tortfeasor to shift the burden of punitive damages to his insurer."); see also
City of Newark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 342 A.2d 513, 518 ( N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1975) (holding that public policy prohibits insurance coverage for
intentional misconduct). But see Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 606
(N.J. 1978) (noting that public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for
punitive damages when insured is innocent third party).
New York: Hartford, 397 N.E.2d at 744 ("[W]e conclude that the rule to be
applied with respect to a punitive damage award made in a Civil Rights Act action
is that coverage is proscribed as a matter of public policy ... because to allow
insurance coverage is totally to defeat the purpose of punitive damages, but a
number of other reasons are also involved."); see also Home Ins. Co. v. American
Home Prod. Corp., 550 N.E.2d 930, 932 (N.Y.) (considering nature of plaintiff's
claim, including degree of wrongfulness for which damages were awarded, state's
law and public policy on punitive damages and prohibiting insurance of punitive
damages through second-level excess insurer in out-of-state products liability
case), aff'd inpart,rev'd inpart,902 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1990); Public Serv. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 814-15 (N.Y. 1981) (determining that even
though professional liability policy provided coverage for punitive damages and
that insurer charged premiums for such coverage, if trier of fact found that the
insured "intentionally caused injuries complained of, and therefore awarded punitive damages," dentist could not look to insurer for indemnification).
North Dakota: Yesel v. Watson, 226 N.W. 624, 625 (N.D. 1929) ("The authorities abundantly support the ruling of the trial court ...that one who is liable for
the act of another by reason of being surety upon his official bond is not answerable for punitive damages that might be recoverable against the wrongdoer.").
Ohio Casey v. Calhoun, 531 N.E.2d 1348, 1348 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (stating
that enforcement of punitive damages clause in insurance contract is prohibited by
public policy).
Oklahoma: Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d
1155, 1155 (Okla. 1980) (holding that Oklahoma public policy prohibits insurance
coverage for acts of "oppression, fraud or malice").
Pennsylvania: Creed v. Allstate Ins. Co, 529 A.2d i0,12-13 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987) (holding that when insurer has agreed to indemnify for "bodily injury and
property damages," it has no obligation to provide indemnity for punitive damages, but also noting that it did not address public policy of whether one can insure against punitive damages), appeal denied, 538 A.2d 499 (Pa. 1988); Esmond v.
Liscio, 224 A.2d 793, 797-803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966) (holding that Pennsylvania
public policy prohibits tortfeasor guilty of wanton misconduct from shifting the
burden of punitive damages to insurer).
South Dakota City of Fort Pierre v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 463 N.W.2d
845, 849 (S.D. 1990) ("[B]ecause we have determined that the civil penalties
prayed for by the federal government were punitive in nature and that in this
instance the award of punitive damages would violate public policy, we hold that
United had no duty to defend City under the policy.").
Virginia: Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 434-42
(5th Cir. 1962) (discussing Florida and Virginia public policy, which prohibits coverage for punitive damages).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss2/6

14

Widiss: Liability Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages - Discerning An
1994]

LIABILrrY INSURANCE COVERAGE

III.

COVERAGE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES

A. Judicial Precedent Sustaining Coveragefor Punitive Damages
In many states, as a result of either judicial precedents or legislative provisions, there are circumstances in which insurers have not
been precluded from providing coverage for punitive damages.
Millions of liability insurance policies do not explicitly specify
whether coverage "is"or "isnot" provided for punitive damages.
Consequently, when an insurer that has issued such a policy rejects
an insured's request for indemnification, courts usually resolve the
coverage dispute by deciding whether to imply an exception to coverage on the basis of public policy.3 3 Judicial decisions sustaining

claims of insureds in such coverage disputes hold, either explicitly
or in effect, that it is not contrary to public policy for an insured to
acquire liability insurance that provides indemnification for punitive damages.3 4 In these decisions judges have articulated a variety
33. When insurers reject indemnification claims thereby creating disputes for
the courts to resolve, they often urge courts to imply an exception or exclusion
that eliminates coverage for punitive damages. For a complete discussion of this
issue, see supra notes 12-32 and accompanying text.
34. A survey of selected jurisdictions provides support for the position that
indemnification for punitive damages is not contrary to public policy:
Alabama: American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Werfel, 162 So. 103, 106 (Ala.
1935). The court in American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Werfel stated:
The [insurance] policy, being broad enough to cover personal injury or
death as the result of an accident occurring while the policy was in force,
was therefore broad enough to cover liability for death, and recovery
under the homicide statute (section 5696, Code) for wrongful death.
This recovery would have been for punitive damages purely. It may not
be successfully contended that the [insurance] policy did not protect
against punitive damages for bodily injuries so inflicted.
Id.; see also Employers Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Brock, 172 So. 671, 673-74 (Ala 1937)
(holding that award of punitive damages waswithin coverage of policy that insured
against "bodily injury or death").
Arizona: Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522, 525 (Ariz.
1972) (sustaining coverage for exemplary damages and commenting that "[i]t is
our holding that the premium has been paid and accepted and the protection has
been tendered, and that under the circumstances public 'policy would be best
served by requiring the insurance company to honor its obligation"); State v.
Sanchez, 579 P.2d 568, 571 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (noting that Price court held that
insurance company must honor its obligation to cover punitive damages, and discussing reasons against coverage for punitive damages).
Arkansas: Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 440 S.W.2d 582,
584 (Ark. 1969) ("As we read the [insurance] policy herein it agrees to pay... all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages, because of
bodily injury ... [and we do not] find anything in the state's public policy that
prevents an insurer from indemnifying its insured against punitive damages.").
Georgia: Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 232 S.E.2d 910,
914 (Ga. 1977) ("The Georgia Insurance Code, Code Ann. § 56-101 et seq. authorizes the issuance of liability insurance. Code Ann. § 56-408(1) provides, 'Liability
insurance, which is insurance against legal liability for... damage. to property....
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(emphasis added)). Punitive damages is a legal liability and accordingly insurance
against such damages is expressly authorized." (citation omitted).
Idaho Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,
511 P.2d 783, 789 (Idaho 1973) ("Insofar as public policy is concerned we reject
McNulty and adopt the Lazenby approach.").
Illinois- Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 245 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969)
The court in Scott v. Instant Parking,Inc. stated:
[W]e hold that these words ['caused by accident'] include injuries cause
by willful and wanton misconduct, and since punitive damages may be
allowed in such a case, they are part of 'all sums' which the insured became liable to pay, and thus are covered by express wording of the policy.
Id.
Indiana: Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F.
Supp. 92, 98 (N.D. Ind. 1976) ("[U]nder Indiana law it is not contrary to public
policy for Norfold & Western to shift the punitive damage award to its liability
insurer, and under the terms of the insurance contract between Norfolk & Western and Hartford, these damages were within the scope of coverage.").
Iowa Skyline Harvestore Sys. Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106, 109
(Iowa 1983) ("We hold that Skyline's [insurance] policy includes coverage of punitive damages, and the public policy purposes of punitive damages do not preclude
such a construction.").
Kansas. Southern Am. Ins. Co. v. Gabbert-Jones Inc., 769 P.2d 1194, 1197-99
(Kan. Ct. App. 1989). In Southern American Insurance Co. v. GabbertJonesthe court
concluded that the insurer is not responsible for the payment of punitive damage
awards even though the insurer is bound by an enforceable obligation under certain excess liability insurance policies. Id. at 1198. However, the court noted that
section 40-2,115 of the Kansas statutory code now provides:
(a) It is not against the public policy of this state for a person or entity to
obtain insurance covering liability for punitive or exemplary damages assessed against such insured as the result of acts or omissions, intentional
or otherwise, of such insured's employees, agents or servants, or of any
other person or entity for whose acts such insured shall be vicariously
liable, without the actual prior knowledge of such insured.
Id. at 1198 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2, 115(a) (1988)).
Kentucky: See Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146, 151-52 (Ky.
1973). In Continental Insurance Co. v. Hancock, the court stated:
Even though punitive damages are allowed solely as punishment and as
deterrent, we do not deem it against public policy to allow liability therefore to be insured against when the punitive damages are imposed for a
grossly negligent act of the insured rather than an intentional wrong of
the insured.
Id.; see also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Baker, 200 S.W.2d 757, 760-62 (Ky. 1947)
(holding that Kentucky statute required insurer of taxicab company to cover punitive damages resulting from employee's assault on passenger).
Louisiana: Creech v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (La. Ct.
App. 1987) The court in Creech v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. stated: "Public policy
is better served by giving effect to the insurance contract rather than by creating an
exclusion based on a judicial perception of public policy not expressed by the
legislature. We hold that public policy does not preclude insurance coverage of
exemplary damage awards under LSA-C.C. Art. 2315.4." Id.; see also Fagot v.
Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342, 344 (E.D. La. 1978) (applying Louisiana law in civil
rights action for wrongful arrest and stating that "[t]he wording of the professional
liability policy that covered the City of Kenner Police Department and its paid
employees at the time of Mr. Fagot's arrest would be highly misleading if the policy
did not cover jury awards of punitive damages" and, as matter of law, "the policy in
question covers punitive damages").
Maine. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 F. Supp. 1090, 1095 (D. Me.
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1972) ("It is well settled that such broad provisions in automobile liability policies
unmistakably include both compensatory and punitive damages.").
Maryland: First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 389 A.2d
359, 367 (Md. 1978) ("[A]pplying the utmost circumspection, we find that the
common sense of the entire community would [not] pronounce it against public
policy for the Bank's insurance company to pay the judgment for exemplary damages assessed against the Bank here.") (quotations omitted).
Michigan: See New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191, 193-95 (6th
Cir. 1943) (holding that Michigan public policy did not prohibit ordinary accident
policy from covering damages when injury was intentionally caused).
Mississippi: Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867, 868 (Miss. 1981) ("As to there
being any public policy in this state against allowing recovery for punitive damages
in a case as this under the terms of an insurance contract as set forth herein ....it
was not against public policy to require the carrier to pay punitive damages.").
Missouri: Colson v. Lloyd's of London, 435 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). In
Colson v. Lloyd's of London, the court considered "whether it would be against public
policy to permit an association of law enforcement officers to insure themselves
against alleged willful and intentional acts." Id. at 47. The court concluded that "it
would tend to discourage them from entering into that public service" if "they
were told by the courts that they could not enter into a contract which would
afford them protection against financial loss arising from claims for punitive damages." Id.; see also Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58, 60 (8th
Cir. 1934) (affirming decision of District Court for Eastern District of Missouri and
stating "[w ] e hold that the punitive damages under the facts here must be held to
be within the meaning and protection of this [insurance] policy; that there is no
public policy, under the circumstances of this case, requiring such provision to be
held invalid"), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935).
Montana: First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 1217,
1223 (Mont. 1984) ("We find that providing insurance coverage of punitive damages is not contrary to public policy."). The court in First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v.
Transamerica Insurance Co. also stated:
Until such time that the law of punitive damages is more certain and
predictable, or until the legislature alters the law of punitive damages or
expressly declares a policy against coverage in all cases, we leave the decision of whether coverage will be permitted to the insurance carriers and
their customers.
Id.; see also Fitzgerald v. W. Fire Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 790, 792 (Mont. 1984) (noting
that "[iun the instant case, appellant [the insurer] creates an ambiguity in the language by contending that we must read into the language the distinction between
punitive and compensatory damages" and stating "[w]e therefore hold that the
language of the insurance contract provides for coverage of punitive damages and
that no public policy in Montana precludes payment of these damages by an insurance carrier").
North Carolina: Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 319 S.E.2d 217, 220 (N.C.
1984) ("We know of no public policy of this State that precludes liability insurance
coverage for punitive damages in medical malpractice cases. North Carolina General Statute § 58-72 appears to authorize insurers to provide coverage for punitive
damages."); Collins & Aikman Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 416
S.E.2d 591, 594 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that definition of damages did not
operate to exclude punitive damages from coverage and if Hartford "intended to
eliminate coverage for punitive damages it could and should have inserted a single
provision stating the policy does not include recovery for punitive damages"),
aff'd, 436 S.E.2d 243 (N.C. 1993).
Oregon: Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1021 (Or. 1977). In
Harrell v. Travelers Indemnity Co., the court stated:
[A]s long as insurance companies are willing, for a price, to contract for
insurance to provide protection against liability for punitive damages to
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of justifications for this result.
persons or corporations deemed by them to be 'good risks' for such coverage, and as long as liability for punitive damages continues to be extended to 'gross negligence,' 'recklessness,' and for other conduct,
Icontrary to societal interests,' we are in agreement with those authorities
which hold that insurance contracts providing protection against such liability should not be held by courts to be void as against public policy.
Id.
Rhode Island: Morrell v. Lalonde, 120 A. 435, 438 (R.I. 1923), errordismissed per
curiam, 264 U.S. 572 (1924). The court in Morrell v. Lalonde stated:
The defendant insurance company by the terms of its liability policy
agreed to indemnify defendant to the amount stipulated therein against
loss from the liability imposed by law upon the assured for damages on
account of bodily injuries'or death suffered'by any person or persons in
consequence of'any malpractice, error or mistake of the assured in the
practice of his profession. The defendant company was liable to the
amount insured to pay any lawful damages which in a case, such as the
case at bar, includes punitive as well as compensatory damages.
Id.
South Carolina: South Carolina State Budget & Control Bd. v. Prince, 403
S.E.2d 643, 648 (S.C. 1991) ("The policy provides that: 'The Fund will pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages.' ... [U]nder the rules of construction and interpretation of insurance policies... [this] ... must be read as encompassing punitive damages ..
");
Carroway v.Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 908, 910 (S.C. 1965). In Carroway v. Johnson, the
court stated:
The policy under consideration did not limit recovery to actual or compensatory damages. The language of the policy here is sufficiently broad
enough to cover liability for punitive damages as such damages are included in the "sums" which the insured' is legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury within the meaning of the policy.
Carroway, 139 S.E.2d at 910.
Tennessee Lazenby v. University Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 5
(Tenn. 1964). The court in Lazenby v. University Underwriters Insurance Co. stated:
The insurance contract in the case at bar is a private contract between
defendant and their assured,...., which when construed as written would
be held to protect him against claims for both compensatory and punitive
damages. Then to hold assured, as a matter of public policy, is not protected by the [insurance] policy on a claim for punitive damages would
have the effect to partially void the contract. We do not think such
should be done except in a clear case, and the reasons advanced do not
make such a clear case.
Id.
Texas: American Home Assurance Co. v. Safeway Steel Prod. Co., 743 S.W.2d
693, 705 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that "under Texas law it was not contrary
to public policy for Rawlings and Safeway to shift the punitive damages awards to
their liability insurance carriers, and that, under the terms of the insurance contracts between the parties, punitive damages were within the scope of coverage");
Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex. Ct. App.
1972) ("[A] policy of automobile liability insurance affords indemnity applicable
to exemplary damages as well as compensatory damages.").
Vermont. State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 101,105 (Vt. 1979). In State v.
Glens Falls Insurance Co., the court stated:
The language 'all sums as damages' means the whole amount due a plaintiff as damages pursuant to a legal judgment or settlement regardless of
how characterized ....
The insurer drafts the contract and can easily
include exclusions for punitive damages, or can bargain a higher pre-
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In some of the judicial precedents that sustain coverage for punitive damages, the courts' comments about the insurability of punitive damages are very expansive. However, the disputes in many
of these cases involved instances in which either: (1) the injured
person's claim against the insured, who sought coverage for an
award of punitive damages, was based on vicarious liability;3 5 or
(2) the conduct of the insured that gave rise to the tort claim was
reckless or wanton, rather than an intentional tortious act.3 6 Courts
in many states have held that one or both of these situations justify
the recognition of an exception to the general rule that prohibits
shifting liability for punitive damages to an insurer. 37 Accordingly,
mium. Where it does neither and uses the language involved here, coverage ought to be had.
Id.
Virginia: See United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Webb, 369 S.E.2d 196, 199 (Va. 1988)
("The insurance company could have inserted the word 'compensatory' before the
word 'damages,' or specifically excluded liability for punitive damages elsewhere in
the policy, and resolved the ambiguity, but it did not. Therefore, we construe the
resulting ambiguity against the insurance company and in favor of coverage.").
West Virginia: Hensleyv. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 233 (W. Va. 1981). The
court in Hensley v. Erie Insurance Co. stated in its Syllabus:
2. Where the liability policy of an insurance company provides that it will
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury and the policy only excludes damages caused intentionally by or at the direction of
the insured, such policy will be deemed to cover punitive damages arising
from bodily injury occasioned by gross, reckless or wanton negligence on
the part of the insured. 3. The public policy of this State does not preclude insurance coverage for punitive damages arising from gross, reckless or wanton negligence.
Id.
Wisconsin: Brown v. Maxey, 369 N.W.2d 677, 688-89 (Wis. .1985) (holding that
"it is not contrary to public policy in this state to insure against punitive damages").
Wyoming Sinclair Oil Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 981 (Wyo.
1984) (holding that "it is not against the public policy of the State of Wyoming to
insure against either liability for punitive damages imposed vicariously based on
willful and wanton misconduct or personal liability for punitive damages imposed
on the basis of willful and wanton misconduct").
Secondary materials also discuss judicial decisions that hold that insurance
liability coverage of punitive damages does not violate public policy. See, e.g.,
Thomas F. Lambert, Does Liability Insurance Cover PunitiveDamages?, 1966 INS. LJ.
75, 75 (advocating insurance coverage for punitive damages); Martin G. Lentz,
Payment of PunitiveDamages by InsuranceCompanies, 15 CLEV. MARSHALL L. REv. 313,
320-21 (1966) ("The logic and validity of the public policy argument that to require insurance companies to pay punitive damages would place a burden upon
the innocent insurance carrier, and ultimately the public itself, is weak and
indefensible.").
35. For a complete discussion of insurance coverage for vicarious liability, see
infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of insurance coverage for reckless or wanton conduct, see
infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
37. For a complete discussion of insurance coverage for punitive damages, see
notes 33-70 and accompanying text.
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the significance of these precedents may be more limited than dicta
in the opinions suggests. Subsequent decisions may hold that
courts will only sustain exceptions to a general prohibition rather
than adopting the view that there is no public policy that precludes
insuring against punitive damages.
1. Interpreting the Coverage Terms
Some judicial precedents sustaining an insured's right to indemnification are based on interpretations of coverage terms in liability insurance policies stating that the insurer will pay "on behalf
of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay."3 8 In these decisions judges reason that punitive damages are a "sum" that an insured is "legally obligated to pay" and,
therefore, the insurance covers punitive damages, as well as compensatory damages, in the absence of explicit policy provisions to
39
the contrary.
38. For example, the insurance agreement in the 1989 Insurance Services Office (ISO) form for comprehensive general liability policies states: "We [the insurer] will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' to which this insurance
applies." (emphasis added). FIRE, CASUALTY AND SURETY FoRMs, supra note 19.
39. A survey of selected states provides support for the position that, in the
absence of explicit policy to the contrary, courts will permit insurance coverage for
punitive damages:
Indiana: Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F.
Supp. 92, 94-98 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (holding that, under Indiana law, insurance policy covering "all sums" included punitive damages).
Iowa: Skyline Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106, 109
(Iowa 1983) (holding that insurance policy covering "all sums" insured included
coverage for punitive damages, unless contract language expressly excluded such
coverage).
Kansas- Southern Am. Ins. Co. v. Gabbbert-Jones, Inc., 769 P.2d 1194, 1197
(Kan. Ct. App. 1989). The Gabbert-Jonescourt stated:
We find the 'all sums' language in the policy before us to be unambiguous and unqualified. The policy does not say that all sums awarded as
compensatory damages will be paid nor that all sums awarded except punitive damages will be paid. As we view it, upon issuance of the policy
Southern bound itself to pay all sums Gabbert might be required to pay
as damages, both compensatory and punitive, because of bodily injury
caused by an accident. We find this is a matter of plain policy language.
Id.
Missouri: Colson v. Lloyd's of London, 435 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
In Colson, the court considered "whether it would be against public policy to permit an association of law enforcement officers to insure themselves against alleged
willful and intentional acts." Id. The court concluded that "it would tend to discourage them from entering into that public service" if "they were told by the
courts that they could not enter into a contract which would afford them protection against financial loss arising from claims for punitive damages." Id.
Oklahoma: Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Corp., 621 P.2d
1155, 1158 (Okla. 1980) ("The policy provisions... make no distinction between
actual and punitive damages. Punitive damages are not specifically excluded. ...
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ConstruingAmbiguity Against the Insurer

The proposition that an ambiguity is construed against the
party responsible for drafting the document is a well-recognized
principle of contract interpretation. There are thousands of judicial opinions resolving insurance coverage disputes in favor of insureds on the basis that a provision of the applicable insurance
policy is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed against the
insurer.40 Among such precedents, there are several decisions
holding that because the insurance policy terms were ambiguous,
punitive damages were covered by liability insurance policies. 41 For
example, Judge Whiting, writing on behalf of the Virginia Supreme
Hence, the policy provision-"for all sums which the insured might become legally
obligated to pay"-is sufficiently broad to include liability for punitive damages."
(citation omitted)).
South Carolina: South Carolina State Budget & Control Bd. v. Prince, 403
S.E.2d 643, 640 (S.C. 1991) (observing that insurance policy at issue used "broader
language which, under the rules of construction and interpretation of insurance
policies, must be read as encompassing punitive damages").
Wisconsin: Brown v. Maxey, 369 N.W.2d 677, 686 (Wis. 1985). The court in
Brown v. Maxey stated:
We do not find that the language in this policy is ambiguous. First, the
punitive damage award in this case was a "sum" that Maxey "[became]
legally obligated to pay as damages." The term "damages" is sufficiently
broad to cover liability for both compensatory and punitive damages. Punitive damages are not specifically excluded from the policy language.
Second, it is clear that these punitive damages were awarded "because of
bodily injury."
Id.
West Virginia: Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 229 (W. Va. 1981) (noting that "the 'all sums' clause in the policy is quite broad"). Some courts interpret
the language of insurance policies that provide coverage for "all sums" as denying
punitive damages coverage. See, e.g., Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d
359, 361-62 (Me. 1982) (holding that insurance policy covering "all sums" did not
include punitive damages); Schnuck Markets Inc. v. Transamerican Ins. Co., 652
S.W.2d 206, 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (same).
40. See APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 4, § 7401 (compiling cases that interpret ambiguous insurance policy terms to cover punitive damages); COUCH,
supranote 9, § 15:14 (same); KEETON & WInISS, supra note 7, § 6.3, at 116 (discussing same).
41. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Webb, 369 S.E.2d 196, 199 (Va. 1988) (interpreting ambiguity against insurer); see also Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567
P.2d 1013, 1015 (Or. 1977). The Harrell court stated:
[W]e hold that [the insurance policy] provisions were ambiguous, at the
least, so as to require the resolution of any reasonable doubts against the
insurance company; that upon reading the policy provisions as set forth
above,. and in the absence of any express exclusion of liability for punitive
damages, a person insured by such a policy would have reason to suppose
that he would be protected against liability for "all sums" which the insured might become "legally obligated to pay" and that the term "damages" would include all damages, including punitive damages which
became, by judgment, a "sum" that he became "legally obligated" to pay.
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Court, concluded: "We agree with those decisions that have found
that language similar to the language at issue is ambiguous, and
that the ambiguity should be construed against the insurer which
42
drafted the policy."
Controversies about whether liability insurance provides indemnification for punitive damages have occurred for several decades. Many insurance forms include express restrictions, often set
forth as exclusions. 43 Obviously, insurance policy forms could expressly exclude coverage for punitive damages. 44 The decisions of
individual insurers, as well as the insurance industry, to omit terms
that would clearly address whether coverage is provided for punitive damages provides considerable support for arguments that the
very absence of such provisions creates an ambiguity in the cover
age terms that some courts appropriately construe against
insurers.

3.

45

Protectingthe Insured's Reasonable Expectations

In some instances, judicial precedents holding that insureds
are entitled to coverage for punitive damages have been premised,
at least in part, on protecting the insured's reasonable expectations
about the scope of coverage. For example, in a Tennessee
Supreme Court decision, Justice Dyer wrote:
The language in the insurance policy in the case at bar,
which is similar to many types of liability policies, has been
construed by most courts, as a matter of interpretation of
the language of a policy, to cover both compensatory and
punitive damages. Since most courts have so construed
this language in the policy, we think the average policy holder
reading this language would expect to be protected against all
42. Webb, 369 S.E.2d at 198 (interpreting ambiguity in insurance policy

against insurance company and in favor of insured).
43. For example, in Taylor v. Lumar, the insurance policy provided the fol-

lowing definition of "damages" in the "definitions" section: "Damages means the
cost of compensating those who suffer bodily injury or property damage from a car
accident. It does not include amounts awarded as a punishment or deterrent, orfor punitive damages." 612 So. 2d 798, 800 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added).

44. For a discussion of the 1978 proposal by the ISO to include a provision in
insurance policies excluding coverage for punitive damages, see infra notes 74-75
and accompanying text.
45. Cf Collins & Ackman Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 416
S.E.2d 591, 595 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) ("If Hartford intended to eliminate coverage
for punitive damages it could and should have inserted a single provision stating
'this policy does not include recovery for punitive damages.'" (quoting Mazza v.
Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 319 S.E.2d .217, 223 (N.C. 1984))).
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claims, not intentionally inflicted.46
When an insurance company broadly defines the scope of coverage
by using the term "all sums" in a liability insurance policy, it is reasonable for an insured, particularly those who lack expertise about
insurance arrangements, 47 to expect that the coverage applies (subject to the policy's limit of liability) to all amounts that may be
awarded by a court against the insured, including punitive
damages.
4.

Maximizing Indemnificationfor the Injured Person

In England, courts- began to award punitive damages during
the middle of the eighteenth century in order to provide injured
persons with compensation for non-physical injuries, as well as to
punish wrongdoers. 48 At the beginning of the nineteenth century,
courts in the United States recognized the right of injured persons
to recover compensation for pain, suffering and mental anguish in
tort actions. Thereafter, most American courts focused the justification for punitive damages awards exclusively on the goals of punishment and deterrence. 49 Nevertheless, some American courts
have continued to hold that awards of punitive damages are compensatoly.50 In those states, it is arguable that courts should interpret
liability insurance to provide coverage for punitive damages in or46. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. 1964)
(emphasis added).
47. Arguably, the reasonable expectations of insureds are not involved when
the purchaser has expertise and, therefore, is aware of the longstanding issue
about whether insurance may provide coverage for punitive damages. For a discussion of the effect of expertise on an insured's reasonable expectations, see infra
notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
48. See Wilkes v. Wood, 95 Eng. Rep. 766, 766 (1763) (awarding punitive damages) (1763); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768 (1763) (same); see alsOJAMES
D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNrrVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRAcrICE § 1.01
(1985) (advocating early availability of punitive damages to compensate non-physical injuries); Griffin B. Bell & Perry E. Pearce, Punitive Damages and the Tort System,
22 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 3 (1987) (advocating early availability of punitive damages to
punish wrongdoer).
49. Bell & Pearce, supra note 48, at 4 ("After the 1830's, the increasing
number of actual damage awards for mental anguish led courts to focus on the
deterrence and penal functions of exemplary damages.").
50. A review of selected states supports this observation:
Connecticut Lanese v. Carlson, 344 A.2d 361, 364 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1975)
("[I]n this state, the purpose of exemplary damages and the rules for their determination indicate that they are essentially compensatory, not punitive, in fact and
effect.").
Louisiana: Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342, 345 (E.D. La. 1978) (stating
that "[i]ndeed, to the extent that Louisiana permits damage awards that other
states would term 'exemplary' or 'punitive,' Louisiana has relied on what may
often be viewed as the compensatory nature of even punitive damages").
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der to provide more complete indemnification
individuals.
5.

for injured

Coverage for Punitive Damages Awarded When the Tortious Conduct
Was Wanton or Reckless

The type of conduct thatjustifies an award of punitive damages
varies substantially among the states. In several jurisdictions, punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that falls far short of involving a clear intent to cause injury. In assessing whether
insurance provides coverage for an amount awarded as punitive
damages, courts in some states distinguish between negligent and
intentional conduct. 5 1 This approach was succinctly described by
Chief Judge Thelton Henderson:
Jurisdictions which allow punitive damage insurance
have a much lower threshold for awarding punitive damages, allowing them for "gross negligence or reckless or
Michigan: Ray v. City of Detroit, 242 N.W.2d 494, 496 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
In Ray v. City of Detroit, the court stated:
We find that the award of the trial judge was entirely proper. The "exemplary" damages were compensatory in nature and constituted an appro- priate enlargement of actual damages. They were not punitive nor were
they given for the purpose of making an example of the defendant....
We see no reason why the municipal corporation, if found to be liable to
the plaintiff, should be excused from compensating her for the injury to
her feelings and for the sense of indignity and outrage when these are
part of the totality of the injury she actually suffered.
Id.
New Hampshire Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66, 68 (N.H.
1972). The court in Vratsenes v. New HampshireAuto, Inc. stated:
No damages are to be awarded as a punishment to the defendant or as a
warning and example to deter him and others from committing like offenses in the future. In other words, no damages other than compensatory are to be awarded. However, when the act involved is wanton,
malicious, or oppressive, the compensatory damages awarded may reflect
the aggravating circumstances.
Id.
Secondary sources also discuss cases that hold that punitive damages are compensatory in nature. See, e.g., William P. Zuger, Insurance Coverage of PunitiveDamages, 53 N.D. L. REv. 239, 257-58 (1976) (discussing whether and to what extent
liability insurance policies may provide coverage for punitive damages).
51. See, e.g., Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 229 (W. Va. 1981) (stating that public policy does not preclude insurance coverage for punitive damages
arising from gross, reckless or wanton negligence); Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146, 151-52 (Ky. 1973). The Hancock court stated:
Even though punitive damages are allowed solely as punishment and as a
deterrent, we do not deem it against public policy to allow liability therefor to be insured against when the punitive damages are imposed for a
grossly negligent act of the insured rather than an intentional wrong of
the insured.
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wanton conduct." The City Products court noted that
courts in such jurisdictions have recognized the unfairness
to a person "who might well be ruined financially by a
judgment for punitive damages as the result of conduct of
no more flagrancy than an act of 'gross negligence,' a
monetary 'reckless' act, or conduct 'contrary to societal
interest.' "52
Similarly, the Montana Supreme Court reasoned:
A consistent theme running through cases holding that
public policy does not forbid insurance coverage is that
juries and judges typically award punitives for a broad
range of conduct not often described as willful or wanton,
but as merely reckless or unjustifiable. When combined
with the possibility that different fact finders in similar fact
situations may reach differing conclusions as to the availability of punitive damages, the argument for denial of cov53
erage becomes difficult to sustain.
Further, a Texas appellate court observed: "As long as insurance
companies are willing, for a price, to provide protection against liability for punitive damages to corporations they deem 'good risks,'
and as long as punitive damage liability continues to extend to
'gross negligence,' we see no reason why these contracts should
not be enforced." 54 In effect, such decisions recognize an exception to the general prohibition on liability coverage for punitive
damages. In these states, courts have decided it is not against public policy for liability insurance to provide coverage for punitive
damages that result from grossly negligent, reckless or wanton acts.
52. Continental Casualty Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1368, 1371-72
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (quoting City Prod. Corp. v Globe Indem Co., 151 Cal. Rptr. 494,
499 (Ct. App. 1979)). In Continental Casualty Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., the court
stated:
The City Products court recognized a sharp split among jurisdictions as to
the insurability of punitive damages. The Court noted that the jurisdictions which prohibit insurance for punitive damages are those in which
punitive damages are allowed for only exceptionally egregious conduct,
defined as "fraud, oppression or malice." In such jurisdictions, punitive
damages have as their only purpose punishment and deterrence. This
purpose would be undermined by insurance.
Id. at 1371 (citation omitted).
53. First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 1217, 1222
(Mont. 1984).
54. American Home Ins. Assurance Co. v. Safeway Steel Prod., 743 S.W.2d
693, 705 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
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Extending Coverage to Insureds Who Are Vicariously Liablefor
Punitive Damages

There are various types of situations in which insureds-including corporations and other enterprises-are vicariously liable
for the tortious conduct of third persons. For example, when an
employee commits a tort, liability may be imposed on the individual's employer. Courts have adopted several approaches to assess
whether an employer is responsible for an employee's actions.
These approaches include vicarious liability based on: (1) the
scope of employment; 55 (2) approval or ratification of an employee's act;56 (3) recklessness in either employing or retaining an
individual; 57 (4) specific authorization of the employer for an act
causing injury; or (5) some degree of participation in actions caus58
ing injury.
55. See generally 19 C.J.S. Corporations§ 1285 (1940) (discussing scope of employment rule). Corporations may be liable for punitive damages arising from the
acts of its agents or employees committed within the scope of employment. Id. In
many jurisdictions, courts will impute the conduct of employees acting within the
scope of their employment without regard to whether the employer authorized or
ratified the acts. Id. In effect, when an employer vests an agent with authority to
act, courts will treat actions that are within the scope of employment as acts of the
employer. See, e.g., Western Coach Corp. v. Vaughn, 452 P.2d 117, 119-20 (Ariz.
1969) (holding corporate employer liable for punitive damages resulting from
conduct of servant acting with reckless indifference to rights of others); Life Ins.
Co. v. Del Aguila, 389 So. 2d 303, 305-06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that
jury could assess punitive damages against employer for insurance fraud of its employees, although employer did not authorize or ratify fraud).
56. In many states, courts have adopted the authorization/ratification rule as
a basis for employers' liability. In states that adopted this approach, courts often
hold that authorization can be inferred from an employer's conduct. Note that in
few cases does an employer expressly ratify the wrongful act of an employee. Most
of the cases applying the authorization/ratification rule imply ratification because
the employer retained the benefits of an employee's wrongful act. Usually the
intent element of ratification involves an employer's act from which the court can
infer ratification. See, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Haley, 66 F. 133, 140 (8th Cir. 1895) (holding that jury may award punitive damages where agent carrying out instructions of
principal commits trespass and principal later accepts benefits of trespass). In
some cases, courts base ratification on an employer's retention of an employee
after the employer discovers the wrongful act. See, e.g., Coats v. Construction Gen.
Laborers Local 185, 93 Cal. Rptr. 639, 643 (Ct. App. 1971) (holding that retaining
employee in service of employer indicates employer's approval of employee's
course of action and, with other acts, may make employer liable for punitive
damages).
57. See, e.g.,
Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Wiesenberger, 15 Ohio App. 437, 443 (Ct.
App. 1922) (holding corporation liable for punitive damages resulting from employee's wilful assault on another only if corporation knew employee had bad
character).
58. In several jurisdictions, courts premise employers' liability on the fact that
the employer did something that, in effect, involves the employer in the act of the
employee. For example, in one of the landmark cases in this area the plaintiff
sought punitive damages against a railroad for the "wanton and oppressive" acts of
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When an individual or an entity, such as a corporation, is vicariously liable for compensatory damages, some courts have concluded that punitive damages may also be awarded against such a
defendant, reasoning that: (1) an award of punitive damages is a
penalty for the defendant's failure to supervise; (2) such an award
will influence the supervision of persons in the future; or (3) the
corporation's past conduct in regard to the events was particularly
reprehensible. Section 909 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
sets forth the view that punitive damages may be warranted when:
(a) the principal or a managerial 59 agent authorized
the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaininghim, or,
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity
and was acting in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the princi60
pal ratified or approved the act.
In other words, members of the Institute that adopted the Restateits employees in wrongfully arresting the plaintiff for allegedly using an improper
railroad ticket. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893). In Lake
Shore & MichiganSouthern Railway v. Prentice, the Supreme Court stated that "punitive damages, being awarded, not by way of compensation to the sufferer, but by
way of punishment of the offender and as a warning to others, can only be against
one who has participated in the offense." Id. at 107.
59. Courts have defined "managerial capacity" as a function of the employee's
or agent's business judgment in which he or she may ultimately shape corporate
policy.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979) (emphasis added); accord
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1958) (containing essentially same
rule except that phrase "or retaining" is not included in part (b)). The authors of
the Restatement of Torts stated that the Restatement approach is consonant with vicarious liability for both compensatory and punitive damages:
When managers could not have prevented an agent's misconduct, even
with the utmost managerial care and responsibility, the Restatement rule
would not impose punitive damages upon the management, under the
theory that in order to maximize deterrence and punishment, one should
require participation in the wrongful action by those in control of the
business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 909, cmt. b.

Some commentators have criticized the distinction that the Restatement
draws between the acts of managerial and menial employees. For example, Chief
Justice Rose dissented in a case in which the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted the
Restatement approach. See Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1133 (Wyo. 1981)
(Rose, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that entity can act willfully and wantonly through
all of its employees, not just managerial employees). Chief Justice Rose saw no
logical distinction between the acts of menial and managerial employees when
"[t] he act of any corporate employee done in the furtherance of the corporation's
business is the act of the corporation." Id. at 1134.
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ment approved the use of punitive damages to affect the conduct of
managers, directors, and officers of a business who are responsible
for, as well as being in a position to influence, the conduct of
61
employees.
Courts in many states have concluded that the general rule
that prohibits an insured from obtaining coverage for punitive
damages does not apply when a judgment against the insured is
predicated on vicarious liability. In these decisions, a distinction is
drawn between punitive damages that are imposed on the person
whose actions directly caused injuries and punitive damages that
are assessed on the basis of vicarious liability. 6 2 In effect, suchcases
61. Several states have adopted the Restatement approach:
California Hale v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 117 Cal. Rptr. 146, 152-53 (Ct. App.
1975) (adopting Restatement approach).
Idaho- Openshaw v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 487 P.2d 929, 932 (Ill. 1971) (stating that "[t]o be entitled to an award of punitive damages against a corporation
the complaining party must show that the principal (or when the principal is a
corporation, its directors and managing officers) participated in or authorized or
ratified the agent's acts").
1976). In
Illinois Tolle v. Interstate Sys. Truck Lines, 356 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ill.
Tolle v. Interstate System Truck Lines, the court stated:,
The complicity rule, on the other hand, seems consistent with the
rationale behind the concept of punitive damages. Either as a basis for
punishment or for deterrence of wrongdoers, some deliberate corporate
participation should be shown before this sanction is applied. The complicity analysis will allow punitive damages where the institutional conscience of the corporate master should be aroused while protecting the
corporate master from liability for punitive damages when a properly supervised employee acts with requisite circumstances of aggravation.
Id. (citation omitted).
New York: Gill v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 129 N.Y.S.2d 288, 294 (App. Div.
1954). The court in Gill v. Montgomery Ward & Co. stated:
Punitive damages may be recovered against an employer because of the
malicious act of his employee only if it is shown (a) that the malicious act
was authorized or ratified by the defendant; (b) that the act was that of an
unfit employee who had been employed or retained by the defendant
with knowledge of his unfitness; or (c) that the act was that of a managerial agent or employee whose willfulness or maliciousness was chargeable
to the defendant.
Id. (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 909 (1979)).

Texas- King v. McGulf, 234 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex. 1950) (stating that "the
general rule prevailing in Texas may, for the purposes of this suit, be stated the
same as in the Restatement, Torts, § 909").
Wyoming. Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Wyo. 1981). The court in
Campen v. Stone stated:
We likewise believe that the Restatement's approach is the best. It is consistent with the purpose behind punitive damages. Further, it is relatively
straight forward and easy to apply. Accordingly, we adopt the test as set
forth in the Restatement as the one to be used in determining when an
employer may be held liable for punitive damages as a result of the misconduct of the employee.
Id.
62. A review of selected jurisdictions will clarify this distinction:
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Arkansas- Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 440 S.W.2d 582,
584 (Ark. 1969). In Southern Farm Bureau CasualtyInsurance Co. v. Danie4 the court
stated:
[W]e [cannot] find anything in the state's public policy that prevents an
insurer from indemnifying its insured against punitive damages arising
out of an accident, as distinguished from intentional torts. Since we have
permitted punitive damages to be assessed against an employer under the
doctrine of respondeat superior or even in the absence of the employer's
knowledge or authorization of the employee's acts, we can perceive of no
good reason why an employer should be prohibited from insuring himself against such losses, since the losses are in effect a business loss-i.e., a
calculated risk of doing business.
Id.
California: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 847, 849 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
("California law has long held that an insured who becomes liable for the intentional act of another insured is entitled to a defense and to indemnity pursuant to
the terms of a contract of personal liability insurance notwithstanding policy language barring coverage for intentional acts."); Arenson v. National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co., 286 P.2d 816, 818 (Cal. 1955) (holding that insurance provided
coverage for punitive damages assessed against parent for child's wrongful act).
Florida: United States Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla.
1983) ("Florida public policy does not preclude insurance coverage of punitive
damages when the insured himself is not personally at fault, but is merely vicariously liable for another's wrong.").
Illinois- Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1981) (stating that while it is against public policy to insure against punitive damages that arise out of one's own misconduct, an employer may insure itself against
punitive damages for vicarious liability assessed against it in consequence of employees' wrongful conduct).
Indiana: Grant v. North River Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Ind.
1978). The court in Grant v. North River Insurance Co. stated:
[T]o the extent, if any, which an insured in this cause is held vicariously
liable for such acts or conduct, public policy does not prevent the shifting
of liability for the punitive damages to an insurer, where, as here, the
insurers have contractually agreed to provide coverage for such liability.
Id.; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 92, 95
(N.D. Ind. 1976) ("The rule against shifting the impact of a punitive damage
award has an exception [under Indiana law], however. An employer may be held
liable for a punitive damage award against his agent when the agent acted within
the scope of his employment.").
Missouri: Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir.
1934) (applying Missouri law to motor vehicle accident and stating that "[i]n this
situation where there was no direct or indirect volition upon the part of the master
in the commission of the act, no public policy is violated by protecting him from
the unauthorized and unnatural act of his servant"), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734
(1935).
New Hampshire Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Derry, 387 A.2d 1171,
1173-74 (N.H. 1978). In Commercial Union Assurance Companies v. Deny, the insurer
urged the court to impute the police officer's alleged tortious intent to the town.
The court stated that although an employer can be liable for the acts of its employees, no public policy precludes "insuring against the consequences of an unauthorized willful wrong allegedly committed by another insured." Id. Accordingly, the
court held that the. insurer was obligated to both defend and indemnify the insured town in a suit arising from the alleged intentionally tortious conduct of a
town police officer.
New Jerse. Malanga v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., 146 A.2d 105, 108 (N.J.
1958) (stating that "[t]he reason the insurance policy denies coverage of an assault
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hold both that (1) the provisions commonly used in liability insurance policies do not preclude coverage, for damages awarded for an
intentional tort when the insured is vicariously liable, and (2) it
would be inappropriate to imply a limitation that restricts coverage
63
in such situations.
When punitive damages awarded against an insured are paid
by an insurance company, the punishment intended for the insured
and battery committed by or at the direction of an insured is that it would be
contrary to public policy to indemnify a person for a loss incurred as a result of his
own willful wrongdoing").
New York: Morgan v. Greater N.Y. Taxpayers Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 112 N.E.2d 273,
275 (N.Y. 1953). In Morgan v. GreaterNew York Taxpayers Mutual Insurance Association, the victim of an assault by one member of a partnership obtained ajudgment
against the partner individually and the partnership. In a proceeding to recover
the judgment from the partnership's public liability insurer, the court held in the
victim's favor. Id. The Morgan court stated that a second partner, who was jointly
and severally liable for judgment against the partnership, was a named insured in
the applicable insurance policy. Id. Further, the court held that the "assault and
battery" clause of the policy did not exclude coverage for his liability because the
assault was neither by him nor at his direction. Id. The Morgan court stated:
[T]he.defendant [insurer] has undertaken separateand distinctobligations
to the various assureds, named and additional, and where liability is imposed upon one of the assureds for assault by another assured in which
he took no part, the result should be no different for that which would
obtain where the assault was committed by a person who is not an
insured.
Id.
Oklahoma: Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d
1155, 1156 (Okla. 1980). The court in Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mutual
Liability Insurance Co. stated:
We are in accord with this view and hold that public policy against insurance protection for punitive damages does not preclude recovery of indemnity from "the insurer by an employer to whom either willfulness or
gross negligence of his harm-dealing employee became imputable for imposition of liability under the Oklahoma application of the respondeat superior doctrine.
Id. at 1160 (footnote omitted).
South Carolina: Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53, 55 (4th
Cir. 1952) (applying South Carolina law and stating that insurance policy may provide coverage for punitive damages assessed against vicariously liable employer for
tortious acts of employee at his or her initiative).
Wyoming. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 981
(Wyo. 1984) (holding that "it is not against the public policy of the State of Wyoming to insure against either liability for punitive damages imposed vicariously
based on willful and wanton misconduct or personal liability for punitive damages
imposed on the basis of willful and wanton misconduct").
63. From the point of view of the insured, as well as of the victim, the harm
for which an insured is vicariously liable is often appropriately viewed as a fortuitous occurrence. For example, courts have concluded that the intentional torts of
children, such as battery or acts of vandalism, are fortuitous as to parents who are.
liable for negligently failing to supervise their children to prevent their children
from causing harm. See e.g., Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 579 P.2d
1015, 1019 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (permitting insurance coverage for punitive
damages assessed against parent for child's wrongful act).
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is obviously mitigated and any deterrent effect is substantially diminished. Judicial precedents sustaining coverage when an insured
is vicariously liable generally have not involved the type of conduct-instances in which corporate managements were extremely
reckless or grossly irresponsible in employing an individual, in supervising an employee, or in approving some action of an employee-section 909 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
identifies as warranting an award of punitive damages against a
"principal or managerial agent." 64 Consequently, there may still be
some additional problems to be considered by courts in those states
in regard to whether liability insurance coverage will be afforded
65
for employers in such circumstances.
B.

Legislation Providing That Liability Insurance May Be Afforded
for Punitive Damages

Legislation in several states specifies that-at least for some
types of situations-public policy does not preclude coverage for
punitive damages. For example, the Kansas Insurance Code
provides:
It is not against the public policy of this state for a person or
entity to obtain insurance covering liability for punitive or
exemplary damages assessed against such insured as the
result of acts or omissions, intentional or otherwise, of
such insured's employees, agents or servants, or of any
other person or entity for whose acts such insured shall be
vicariously liable, without the actual prior knowledge. of such
66

insured.

In Virginia, legislation distinguishes between instances involving intentional acts and wanton or willful negligence:
It is not against the public policy of the Commonwealth for any
person to purchase insurance providing coverage for punitive damages arising out of the death or injury of any
person as the result of negligence, including willful and
wanton negligence, but excluding intentional acts. This sec64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979).
65. For a discussion of whether insurance should provide coverage for punitive damages assessed against corporations vicariously liable for defective products,
see infra note 107 and accompanying text.
66. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2, 115 (1984) (emphasis added). Similarly, the
North Carolina Insurance Code provides that "[w]ith respect to liability insurance
policy forms, an insurer may exclude or limit coverage for punitive damages
awarded against its insured." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-41-50(a) (1991).
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tion declares existing policy. 6 7
Further, in Pennsylvania the legislature has made a special provision for operators of skiing areas: "(b) Insurability. -It is not
against the public policy of this Commonwealth for an insurance company to insure the operatorof a downhill skiing area againstpunitive damages, other than those punitive damages arising from an intentional
tort committed by such operator."68 Finally, the Hawaiian Insurance Code states: "Coverage under any policy of insurance issued
in this State shall not be construed to provide coverage for punitive
or exemplary damages unless specifically included." 69 The Hawai-

ian legislation conveys a somewhat ambiguous message. On the
one hand, because the right of some insureds to be indemnified is
affirmed, such legislative provisions might be viewed as favoring the
interests of insureds. However, the effect of the Hawaii statute is
probably to eliminate coverage in many instances.
In over a dozen other states legislation creating guaranty associations or funds that provide indemnification for insureds when
an insurer has become insolvent or bankrupt excludes coverage for
punitive damages.

For example, the Arkansas Insurance Code

states that "[c]overed claims shall not include any amount awarded
as punitive or exemplary damages."70 If public policy in these states

clearly precluded liability insurance from providing coverage for
punitive damages, such statutory prohibitions would be both unnecessary and redundant. Thus, legislation prohiting indemnifica-

tion for punitive damages awards from such funds or guaranty
associations indicates that the legislature did not recognize any
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-227 (Michie 1986) (emphasis added).
68. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2051 (1992) (emphasis added). Similarly, the

South Carolina Insurance Code provides that under automobile liability insurance
"damages" include both compensatory and punitive damages. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 38-77-30 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
69. HAW. REv. STAT. § 431:10-240 (1988); cf. NJ. REV. STAT. § 17:22-6.72

(1987) (providing that" 'c] overed claim' shall also not include amounts for interest on unliquidated claims, punitive damages unless covered by the policy, counsel
fees for prosecuting suits for claims against the fund, and assessments or charges
for failure by an insolvent insurer to have expeditiously settled claim").
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-90-103

(Michie 1992); see also CAL. INS. CODE

§ 1063.1(c) (8) (West 1991) (providing that "covered claim" does not include
amounts awarded as punitive damages); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 4205(6) (1991)
(same); HAw. REv. STAT. § 431:16-105 (1988) (same); IDAHO CODE § 41-3605
(1993) (same); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5/534.3(b)(ii) (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 515B.2(b)(5) (West 1993) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 40-3412(d) (1986) (same); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-23-109(f) (1993) (same); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-47-35(f) (1991) (same); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2004(6) (1990)
(same); R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-34-5(6)(b)(1)(i) (1989) (same); UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-28-203 (1993) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-1603 (Michie 1990) (same).
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487

clear public policy that would preclude liability insurance coverage
for punitive damages.
IV.

RESOLVING QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER COVERAGE IS

PROVIDED FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LEGISLATIVE AND
CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS

A.

Legislation

For most of this century, questions about whether liability in-

surance policies provided coverage for punitive damages were resolved in the nation's courtrooms. During the past two decades,
however, some legislatures have directly addressed this issue. 71
States have adopted several distinctive types of legislation. First, in
one or two states, insurers are statutorily prohibited from providing
72
coverage for punitive damages.

Second, there are a few states in which legislation-addressing
concerns of a specific group-specifies some circumstances in
which it is not against public policy for liability insurance to provide
coverage for punitive damages. These statutes afford insurers and
insureds the freedom to contract for such coverage. However, by
inference, such legislation indicates that it would be against public
policy for insurance to provide coverage for punitive damages in
circumstances other than those specified.

Third, several other states have enacted statutes providing "coverage under any policy of insurance .. . shall not be construed to
provide coverage for punitive or exemplary damages unless specifically included." 73
The form of the legislation in these states
presents the intriguing question of whose interests are served by
such provisions. On initial consideration, it appears that this type
71. In many states, legislation now addresses at least some aspects of the insurance coverage questions created by punitive damage awards. For a discussion of
state legislation that addresses this issue, see supra notes 66-70 and infra notes 72-73
and accompanying text.
72. For examples of state legislation that prohibit insurance coverage for punitive damages, see supra note 70 and accompanying text. The legislation in these
states clarifies the coverage issue, and in a few instances, effectively reverses precedent established by courts.

73. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-240 (1987) (providing that "[cloverage
under any policy of insurance issued in this state shall not be construed to provide
coverage for punitive or exemplary damages unless specifically included') (emphasis
added); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-317 (1987) (same); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN., § 17:226.72 (West 1987) (providing that "'[c]overed claim' shall also not include
amounts for interest on unliquidated claims, punitive damages unless covered by the
policy, counsel fees for prosecuting suits for claims against the fund, and assessments or charges for failure by an insolvent insurer to have expeditiously settled
claim") (emphasis added).
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of legislation-by authorizing the sale of insurance for punitive
damages-serves the interests of purchasers who want to arrange
coverage, as well as insurance companies that want to sell coverage.
However, perhaps less obviously, such legislation also serves the interests of insurance companies that want to avoid providing coverage for punitive damages, but do not want to include an exclusion
in the coverage terms. The importance of these legislative provisions to insurers that do not want to provide coverage for punitive
damages is best understood by recalling that in the late 1970s the
Insurance Services Office (ISO) 7 4 proposed adding an exclusion to
liability insurance policies which would have eliminated coverage
for punitive damages. The proposal precipitated what was, especially in retrospect, an extraordinary debate within the industry.
The proposed exclusion was vehemently attacked by some segments
of the industry, particularly sales representatives. Within a few
months of the original announcements, the proposed exclusion was
withdrawn.
Legislation specifying that coverage for punitive damages is
only provided when there is a provision expressly so stating in the
insurance contract allows insurance companies that do not wish to
provide coverage to do so without offending either sales representatives or purchasers by including an explicit coverage limitation or
exclusion. When, as is usually the case, liability insurance policies
define coverage in terms of "all sums," without specifying any categories or characterizations, it is virtually indisputable that "punitive"
or "exemplary" damages have not been "specifically" or "expressly included." Thus, such legislation implicitly codifies an exclusion of
75
punitive damages.
B.

Explicit ContractualProvisions

Anglo-American legal doctrines, initially developed by the English common law courts, provide freedom for parties to arrange
74. The ISO, organized in 1971, is a national organization that compiles data
for underwriting many types of property and liability insurance. The ISO, an association of insurance companies, also prepares standard forms for various types of
insurance coverage that are used by hundreds of insurance companies in the
United States. At one time, such organizations provided members with actuarial
computations, including premium rates. However, this type of service has been
reduced or eliminated for many types of insurance.
75. Legislation that precludes coverage for punitive damages unless a liability
insurance policy expressly includes such coverage creates an exclusion of punitive
damages without altering the contractual terms in insurance policy forms. This
legislation presumably satisfies segments of the insurance industry-such as sales
representatives-who fought the introduction of explicit exclusions for punitive
damages.
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their contractual relationships. 76 The "Freedom to Contract" principle has substantial import for contractual provisions in insurance
policies specifying either exclusions or inclusions. There are literally thousands of appellate court decisions sustaining the enforceability of coverage limitations on the basis. that courts should
enforce the parties' agreement as set forth in the applicable insurance policy.
1.

Coverage Terms Excluding Insurance for Punitive Damages

Insurers may make explicit qualifications, limitations or restrictions by employing an approach that ensures the purchaser's actual
expectation is the same as the insurer's77 or that it would be "unreasonable" for a purchaser to have a contrary expectation.718 Provisions in liability insurance policies excluding coverage for punitive
damages undoubtedly are enforceable contracts. 79 Even if there
might be some hesitance concerning the enforceability of such exclusions in insurance policies issued to individuals, there would be
little, if any, problem with ensuring that enterprisespurchasing liabil76. Many commentators have described the importance some common law

courts attach to the "freedom to contract." See, e.g.,JoHN D. CA.AMAm &JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACrs 5 (1987). These commentators stated:
As freedom became a rallying cry for political reforms, freedom of contract was the ideological principle for the development of the law of contract. Williston adds; 'Economic writers adopted the same line of
thought. Adam Smith, Ricardo Bentam, andJohn Stuart Mill successively
insisted on freedom of bargaining as the fundamental and indispensable
requisite of progress ....
Id. (citations omitted).

77. Cf

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACrS

§ 201(1) (1981) (stating that

"[w] here the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement
or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning").
78. See, e.g., Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 469
A.2d 563, 567 (Pa. 1983). In Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Insurance Co., the court stated:
We hold only that where, as here, the policy limitation relied upon by the
insurer to deny coverage is clearly worded and conspicuously displayed,
the insured may not avoid the consequences of that limitation by proof
that he failed to read the limitation or that he did not understand it.
Id. Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
The language of the receipt issued here is clear and unambiguous; the
applicant must have completed the required medical examination before
temporary insurance could be in effect regardless of the company's later
determination of the applicant's insurability. There is no language in the
receipt reasonably inducing any belief of coverage or reliance on interim
insurance prior to the time of compliance with the express conditions
therein set out.
Fields v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 N.E.2d 930, 933 (Ill. 1983).
79. For a further discussion of the enforceability of express exclusions of coverage for punitive damages, see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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ity insurance are, or should be, aware of the restriction.8 0 Moreover, such provisions are in accord with the widely recognized
proposition that liability insurance should not immunize insureds
from the consequences of intentional or wanton actions.
2.

Coverage Terms ProvidingInsurancefor Punitive Damages

In more than half of the states, either judicial decisions or legislative provisions clearly indicate that, at least in some circumstances, it is not against public policy to provide coverage for
punitive damages. Nevertheless, provisions in liability insurance
policies that include coverage for punitive damages raise public policy questions about whether transferring such risks to insurers for
all types of tortious conduct covered by the insurance policywhich might result in an award of punitive damages-unacceptably
erodes the goals of punishment and deterrence.
If punitive damage awards are insurable, insureds-especially
corporations engaged in commercial activities-may begin to evaluate the costs and benefits of conduct that might justify the imposition of punitive damages. As Judge Wisdom commented in 1962:
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with
the establishment of sanctions against such misconduct. It
is not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or
penalties would be void as violative of public policy. The
same public policy should invalidate any contract of insurance against the civil punishment that punitive damages
represent."'
Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court observed:
Protection by insurance coverage of punitive damages will
be available only to those who contract for it, that is, to
those who know they need it, and are able to pay for it.
The [court's] holding will therefore tend to protect people who have wealth and sophistication in legal matters.
Such people will now be able to place themselves above
82
the law of punitive damages.
80. For a discussion of whether corporations can reasonably expect insurance
to provide coverage for punitive damages in the absence of express inclusions, see
infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
81. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir.
1962).
82. Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1025-26 (Or. 1977)
(Holman, C.J., dissenting).
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Prospective assurance to purchasers that insurance coverage is
provided for grossly negligent, wanton and-in at least some instances-intentional acts, creates an aura that is different and distinguishable from retrospective judicial determinations that
coverage is afforded for punitive damages awarded as a consequence of those 'actions.
V.

CONCLUSION

Divergent views about the insurability of punitive damages
have existed for over half a century in the United States. 8 3 It is
clear that questions about whether liability insurance policies afford
coverage for punitive damages-the issue collaterally raised by the
topic that is the primary focus of this symposium-need to be analyzed jurisdiction byjurisdiction. 84 In those states where insurance
coverage for punitive damages is not foreclosed by legislative enactment or judicial decisions, coverage disputes frequently involve several questions. Judicial decisions about whether a liability
insurance policy provides coverage for an insured may be based on
several factors, including the type of tortious conduct, the bases of
liability, the type of activity and differences in the way contract provisions are phrased.
Insurers could eliminate disputes about whether coverage is
provided for punitive damages by inserting. exclusions into liability
insurance policies. Consequently, a persuasive case exists for the
view that the absence of any explicit provisions, in effect, creates an
ambiguity and, therefore, insurers ought to be held liable, as they
generally are when there is an ambiguity in an insurance contract.
In addition, it is also clear that the term "all sums," which is commonly used in statements describing the scope of coverage provided by liability insurance policies, is subject to being broadly
construed or understood to encompass punitive damages. However, in most situations in which either an ambiguity or a term in an
insurance policy is construed against an insurer, there is no countervailing public interest that supports an interpretation of the coverage terms which would result in a denial of an insured's right to
indemnification. Punitive damages generally are premised on a significant public interest that is served by the award. However, shift83. The survey of cases and legislation in the preceding sections indicates that
in many states the issues that need to be specifically addressed in a coverage dispute about punitive damages are probably becoming more, rather than less,
complicated.
84. In some states, results may be determined by the type of tortious act that
caused the injury.
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ing the responsibility for paying an award from the tortfeasor to an
insurance company effectively nullifies the public's interest in
85
awarding punitive damages: punishment and deterrence.
Liability for compensatory damages in tort actions may also serve
to deter or to punish, and deterrence and punishment are sometimes considered to be general goals of tort law. 86 Although it has
been argued that liability insurance is not compatible with the attainment of these objectives, 8 7 neither legislatures nor courts have
regarded such arguments as sufficiently compelling to restrict the
use of insurance policies to transfer the risk of liability for compensatory damages. Accordingly, courtssustain insurance coverage for
compensatory damages-usually, but not invariably, subject to an

exception for intentional torts8 8-even though precisely the same
conduct might have been or is, in some instances, the basis for an
89
award of punitive damages.
From the public's standpoint, the most significant consequence of allowing punitive damages to be insured is the effect that
it would have in reducing or eliminating a possible deterrent to
conduct creating hazards. However, because the types of outrageous or wanton conduct that are most likely to justify an award of
punitive damages also involve violations of criminal laws, it is rea85. Ellis, supra note 6, at 3. Professor Ellis observed:
At least seven purposes for imposing punitive damages can be gleaned
from judicial opinions and the writings of commentators: (1) punishing
the defendant; (2) deterring the defendant from repeating the offense;
(3) deterring others from committing an offense; (4) preserving the
peace; (5) inducing private law enforcement; (6) compensating victims
for otherwise uncompensable losses; and (7) paying the plaintiff's attorney's fees.
Id.
86. Professor Schwartz has observed: "In truth, there is now a rich body of
academic literature supporting the view that a primary purpose of tort liability
rules is to discourage inappropriate behavior on the part of accident causers."
Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages:
A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 132, 137 (1982) (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS 28 (1970) and RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 154-57
(2d ed. 1977)).
87. See, e.g., Breeden v. Frankford Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 119
S.W. 576, 606-10 (Mo. 1909) (holding that insurance does not lessen employer's
liability and that such liability is "neither directly or [sic] by implication impugned,
impaired, abridged, or whittled away" by insurance coverage for punitive
damages).
88. Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603, 603 (N.J. 1978).
89. See, e.g., Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (operating
automobile in reckless manner); cf. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty,
307 F.2d 432, 434-42 (5th Cir. 1962) (refusing to permit insurance coverage for
punitive damages and distinguishing cases that hold insurers liable for compensatory
damages awarded on the basis of recklessness or willful and wanton misconduct).
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sonable to question whether liability for punitive damages is a significant. consideration for individuals who are not deterred by the
threat of criminal penalties. Weighing the competing considerations with regard to liability insurance policies issued to individuals,
it seems to me that one should not accord great significance to the
possible loss of deterrence in regard to individuals who purchase
liability insurance to shift risks that do not involve commercial activities. If the potential advantages of deterrence are not significant
considerations, the rationales that support extending coverage outweigh the remaining public interest in retribution or punishment.
The resolution of the coverage question for business enterprises generally, 90 and, in particular, enterprises that may be responsible for defective products, should be analyzed separatelyespecially with regard to "deterrence"-because different considerations may apply. These issues are addressed in the Addendum that
follows.
VI.

ADDENDUM:

APPRAISING THE APPLICABILITY OF RATIONALES

ARTICULATED BY COURTS TO ISSUES ABOUT INSURANCE COVERAGE

FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGE TO AWARDS IN PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES

Reasons have been advanced-by the authors participating in
this symposium and others-for and against awarding punitive
damages when tort claims are asserted against corporations for injuries resulting from defective products. 9' Similarly, cogent argu90. Professor Owen has stated:

[Alt least three types of defendants stand out as possibly deserving separate treatment: (1) individual defendants; (2) professional defendants
and; (3) institutional defendants.... Surely the forms of power and motivations of a drunk driver are different in substantial measure from those
of a malpracticing doctor or a stock broker, and are different in turn
from misconduct by a power company or automotive manufacturer.
David Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. Rv. 103, 105

(1982).
91. See Albert R. Abramson, Punitive Damages in Aircraft Accident Cases -

A

Debate, 11 FORUM 50, 52 (1975) (explaining that dual purposes of punitive damages
are punishment and deterrence); Grant P. DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal
Injury, ProductsLiability and ProfessionalMalpractice Cases: Bonanza or Disaster,43 INS.
COUNS. J. 344, 345-46 (1976) (stating that punitive damages serve purpose of condemning questionable business practices); Ellis, supra note 6, at 74 (stating that

insurance coverage for punitive damages conflicts with goal of efficient deterrence); Donald M. Haskell, The Aircraft Manufacturer's Liabilityfor Design and Punitive Damages - The Insurance Policy and the Public Policy, 40 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 595,
635 (1974) (calling for equitable balance between consumer and manufacturer to
further technological progress); David Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257, 1285 (1976) (stating.that, despite difficulty in
predicting punitive damages awards manufacturers' behavior will be influenced by
open-ended liability); Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common
Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 133, 133 (1982) (stating
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ments have been urged both in support of and in opposition to
allowing liability insurance to provide insureds with coverage for
punitive damages. 92 In response to these considerations, courts
and some state legislatures have fashioned a variety of laws, rules
93
and doctrines that address the insurability of punitive damages.
In those states in which judicial decisions or legislative acts preclude indemnification by liability insurance for amounts imposed as
punitive damages, 94 issues about coverage in a products liability
case are undoubtedly subject to the general prohibition. Thus, punitive damages awarded as a result of a defective product are not
insurable. However, in many states there is no general prohibition
that precludes shifting the responsibility for paying punitive damages from an insured to an insurer. 95 Moreover, in these states the
resolution of disputes about whether coverage is provided for punitive damages has been premised on at least five or six distinct rationales. The analysis in the following sections considers the
significance or applicability of the rationales articulated by judges
in the appellate court decisions holding that a liability insurance
policy provided coverage for punitive damages to issues about the
insurability of awards resulting from injuries cause by defective
products.
A.

Construction of the Coverage Terms

The insureds who are the defendants in many, and probably
most, of the cases involving claims that result from defective prodthat punitive damages awards are dramatically increasing); Richard Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness,Efficiency, and
Contro, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 37, 37 (1983) (charting unprecedented growth in
mass tort litigation); Symposium Discussion: PunitiveDamages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 155,
160 (Matthew L. Spitzer ed., 1982) (stating that potential punitive damages awards
encourage manufacturers to adopt reasonable standards of care); Forrest L. Tozer,
PunitiveDamages and ProductsLiability, 39 INs. COUNS. J. 300, 301 (1972) (criticizing
application of punitive damages to products liability cases); Michael C. Garrett,
Note, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REv. 613,
629 (1972) (stating that courts should award punitive damages in products liability
cases for purposes of punishment, deterrence and compensation); cf Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838-51 (2d Cir. 1967) (discussing legal difficulties with multiple punitive damages claims and reversing trial court's award of
punitive damages).
92. For a complete discussion of the arguments for and against insurance coverage for punitive damages, see supra notes 11-70 and accompanying text.
93. For examples ofjudicial and legislative responses to the punitive damages
coverage debate, see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
94. For examples of judicial and legislative limitations on coverage for punitive damages, see supra notes 11-32 and accompanying text.
95. For a discussion of the varying state approaches to insurance coverage for
punitive damages, see supra notes 33-70 and accompanying text.
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ucts are enterprises that acquire insurance with the assistance of
individuals who have a relatively high degree of sophistication
about coverage. For example, corporations frequently employ individuals trained as risk managers who are both skilled and well-informed about the scope of protection provided by liability
insurance. In thousands of instances, independent agents 96 and

brokers can and do counsel such insureds.9 7 Moreover, the acquisition of liability insurance by such enterprises is a significant transaction that also may be reviewed by legal counsel. Furthermore, a
corporation acquiring insurance to cover a large number of individual risks, such as automobile manufacturers, often has sufficient
bargaining power either to influence or, in some instances, to specify the coverage terms. 98 Such purchasers either are or should be as

aware as the insurers of the insurance policy terms that leave the
question of coverage for punitive damages unresolved.
When businesses purchasing insurance are guided by persons
with expertise about insurance arrangements, especially when the
coverage terms are specified by the purchaser, the decision not to
address the question of coverage for punitive damages is appropriately attributed to both the insurer and the insured. In such situations, there is virtually no reason to treat an insurance policy that
does not specify whether coverage is provided for punitive damages
as a contract that should be broadly interpreted or construed
against the insurer, in order to indemnify corporations for amounts
awarded as punitive damages.
96. Consider the emphasis in many printed advertisements and television

commercials-sponsored by the Independent Insurance Agents of America on the
advantages of buying insurance with the assistance and the expertise offered by
such agents.
97. In addition, during the past decade the number of insurance consultants
has increased dramatically. Today, many businesses and individuals retain the
services of consultants to provide advice when purchasing insurance coverage.
The classified telephone listings for even relatively small cities usually include several insurance consultants. For example, the 1991 telephone book for Cedar
Rapids, Iowa, a city with a population of approximately 100,000, lists 14 consultants. The Chicago telephone book lists over 200 insurance consultants. Although
many of the listings are for businesses that are also independent agents or brokers
who sell insurance, some consultants only provide advice to their clients.
98. Sometimes when a large corporate enterprise purchases insurance coverage, terms are drafted by or on behalf of the prospective insured in what is commonly described as a "manuscript" insurance policy. This is one of the services
offered by several of the large insurance brokers in the United States, such as Alexander & Alexander Services, Incorporated or Marsh & McLennan Companies, Incorporated. See Bus. INs., July 5, 1993, at 1 (providing ranking and statistics on
world's twenty largest insurance brokers). In some instances, manuscript insurance policies are sent to insurers who are invited to compete for the business by
submitting bids.
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Responsibilityfor EliminatingAmbiguity in Coverage Terms

Insurance companies are, or should be, aware of the disputes
that have arisen as a consequence of omitting express inclusions or
exclusions of punitive damages from liability insurance forms. 99 As
such, insurers that want to preclude coverage for punitive damages
can do so by including express exclusions. 10 0 Moreover, because
provisions excluding coverage for punitive damages have been added to some liability insurance forms, 10 1 insurers should assume
substantial responsibility for whether the absence of such provisions
constitutes coverage for punitive damages. However, when the enterprise purchasing insurance employs individuals who are sophisticated about the coverage terms and this coverage issue, the
justification for resolving the "ambiguity" against the insurer is notably different from the type of situation in which courts generally
sustain coverage claims on this basis. Furthermore, when the parties have employed coverage terms that comply with specifications
prepared on behalf of the purchaser, both the insured and the insurer are appropriately treated as drafters of the contract terms.
Therefore, when enterprises acquire liability insurance, it is inappropriate to assume that the responsibility for ambiguity rests exclusively with the insurer.
C. Reasonable Expectations
Courts throughout the country have recognized that it is appropriate to protect the "reasonable expectations" of policyholders. 10 2 Nevertheless, this doctrine should not automatically justify
99. For a discussion ofjudicial interpretations of ambiguous coverage terms,
see supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
100. The coverage issue could also be resolved by regulatory action-either
legislative or administrative.
101. For an example of insurance forms and provisions that exclude coverage
for punitive damages, see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
102. In 1947, Judge Learned Hand commented:
An underwriter might so understand the phrase, when read in its context,
but the application was not to be submitted to underwriters; it was to go
to persons utterly unacquainted with the niceties of life insurance, who
would read it colloquially. It is the understandingof such persons that counts;
and not one in a hundred would suppose that he would be covered, not
"as of the date of completion of Part B," as the defendant promised, but
only as of the date of approval.
Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir.) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947). Analyses and comments of this type by
judges signaled a new effort to vest insureds with rights that conflict with the terms
of insurance contracts, even when the applicable provisions in the insurance policy
are unambiguous.
The doctrine of protecting reasonable expectations is appropriately summa-
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an expansive reading of the general terms in liability insurance policies to encompass coverage for punitive damages when businesses
produce or distribute defective products.'0 3 As noted in the preceding section, corporate insureds typically employ risk managers
or retain the services of sophisticated insurance brokers. In such
cases, courts should consider whether both the insurer and the insured have chosen to use a contractual arrangement that omits
terms addressing the question of punitive damages coverage. When
an insured has been advised by one or more well-informed counselors concerning the acquisition of liability insurance for commercial
activities, there is no more reason to focus on the reasonable expec10 4
tations of the enterprise's officers than on those of the insurer.
rized as follows: In general, courts will protect the reasonable expectations of applicants and insureds regarding the coverage provided by insurance contracts even
though a careful examination of the policy provisions indicates that such expectations are contrary to the unambiguously expressed intention of the insurer. Cf
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 'OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981). Section 211(3) states:
"Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent
[that is, by 'signing or otherwise agreeing'] would not do so if he knew that the
writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement." Id.
Comment (f) to section 211 states: "Although customers typically adhere to standardized contracts and are bound by them without even appearing to know the
standard terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond
the range of reasonable expectations." Id. cmt. f. The conceptualization of the
reasonable expectations doctrine in the Restatement is considerably more circumscribed than that which is frequently applied by the courts to insurance coverage
disputes. In most instances, an insurer can present a compelling case that he or
she would not include objectionable coverage terms to which a purchaser would
not knowingly agree. This is especially true when the terms at issue are subject to
substantial scrutiny by drafting committees. Further, particularly for insurance
policy forms currently used for the most popular types of coverage, state regulatory
authorities have scrutinized the coverage terms so that insurers have little reason
"to believe that the [purchaser of insurance] would not have accepted the agreement had he or she known that it contained the particular term." Id.
103. The principle of honoring the reasonable expectations of insureds,
which has been applied in hundreds ofjudicial decisions, recognizes the indisputable fact that when an insurance policy is purchased, both parties clearly intend to
create a contract obligating the insurer to provide insurance. Such intent provides
a rationale for considering whether there is a justification for, in effect, invalidating or ignoring a limitation in the terms that the insurer sought to impose on the
obligation. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961, 967 (1970) (discussing history of doctrine of reasonable expectations). Professor Keeton states: "The objectively reasonable
expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations." Id.;. see also KEN ABRAHAM,
DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY ch. 5 (1986)
(stating that courts generally honor reasonable expectations of insureds); ROBERT
H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw § 25D (1987) (discussing, generally,
doctrine of reasonable expectations); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 7, § 6.3 (same).
104. Cf Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 606 P.2d 987, 991 (1980) (holding that
insurer's interpretation of general liability policy was controlling).
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Courts should not predicate coverage decisions in favor of corporations whose decisions about insurance are counseled by experienced individuals on rationales which have been fashioned to
protect the interest of ordinary, and often poorly informed, consumers, who are the appropriate beneficiaries of the judicially conceived doctrine of protecting the reasonable expectations of
insureds.
D.

Maximizing Indemnification for the Injured Person

In some states courts hold that punitive damages serve to maximize the compensation for injured individuals by providing indem10 5
nification for amounts that would not otherwise be recovered.
In these states, it is arguable that insurance coverage for punitive
damages enhances the prospects for fully compensating injured
persons. However, there are several reasons why this should not be
a significant consideration in regard to resolving coverage questions when suits result from defective products.
First, corporate defendants generally have the resources to pay
the judgments rendered against them. In most cases when punitive
damages are awarded against corporate defendants for defective
products, the injured person receives payment regardless of
whether the defendant is indemnified by liability insurance. Of
course, there may be a few instances when a small enterprise 0 6 will
be unable to pay an award. In such cases, courts can fashion an
exception.
Second, no more than three or four states continue to justify
awarding punitive damages in order to provide compensation for
injured claimants. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for the relatively rare and unusual situation-instances in which punitive
damages were awarded as compensatory damages and the amount
awarded by the court can not be paid by the tortfeasor-to guide
105. For a discussion of cases that hold that punitive damages are compensatory in nature, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
106. Undoubtedly, there will also be instances in which a punitive damage
award threatens the continued existence of a large enterprise. However, for most
corporations this will only occur when the award is extraordinarily large, in which
case it was likely determined on the basis of retribution or deterrence. When a
large amount has been awarded as punishment, there is little, if any, justification
for transferring the loss to insurers in order to maximize indemnification for the
injured persons. Similarly, when a punitive damage award against the manufacturer of a defective product is such that the manufacturer cannot afford to pay it,
in virtually all cases, the amount was determined in order to punish the defendant
or to deter similar conduct in the future. Therefore, decisions about the insurability of such awards should not rest on the rationale of maximizing indemnification
for injured persons.
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courts in the formulation of a general proposition in regard to the
insurability of punitive damages awarded as a result of defective
products.
E.

The Vicarious Liability Exception

Courts in many states have recognized an exception to the general prohibition on insurance coverage for punitive damages when
such damages result from vicarious liability. 10 7 However, there are
few, if any, cases in which the rationales for the vicarious liability
exception should be applied as a justification for permitting corporations to be indemnified for amounts awarded as punitive damages in products liability litigation.
Responsibility for the design or manufacture of faulty products
appropriately rests with the executives of an enterprise. Therefore,
the public's interest in safe products mitigates against anything that
serves to diminish the responsibilities of those charged with making
executive decisions about product safety. Consequently, the substantial societal interest in assuring that defective products-especially items which pose threats to the health and safety of the
public-do not enter the marketplace means that it would be very
undesirable to apply the vicarious liability exception in this context.
F.

Conflict of Interests Problems

When a tort claim is asserted against an individual or an entity
that has acquired liability insurance for risks involved in an activity
that may have caused harm to the claimant, the insurer and the
insured often have the same, or at least compatible, interests concerning the possible responses to such a claim. However, when punitive damages are not covered by liability insurance as a
consequence of judicial precedent, an exclusion in the insurance
policy, or a legislative prohibition, there is a conflict of interests
between the insurer and the insured.10 8 This conflict is sufficient to
justify the imposition of restrictions on the insurer's right to select
and direct the attorneys designated to defend the insured. 10 9
107. For a complete discussion of the vicarious liability exception, see supra

notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
108. See Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Co., 479 N.E.2d 988, 992 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (finding conflict of interests between insured and insurer to extent that it

warranted payment of insured's independent counsel fees by insurer); San Diego
Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 503 (Ct. App.
1984) (requiring insurer to pay all of insured's reasonable past and future expenses of independent counsel).
109. For example, in Nandorf,Inc. v. CNA Insurance Co., the court concluded

that a conflict of interests existed when the insurer denied coverage for punitive
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Although some conflict of interests problems can be avoided if liability insurance covers punitive damages, this is not a compelling
consideration because a conflict of interest also exists when an injured person's claim exceeds the applicable coverage limits.1 10 Few
insureds-even substantial enterprises-purchase liability coverage
with limits that exceed the amounts now sought as punitive damages. Therefore, when there is a claim for punitive damages, in
most instances causes there is a conflict that can not be avoided.
G.

Punishment and Retribution

One of the primary rationales for awarding punitive damages is
to punish the tortfeasor.1 1 1 If the rationale which supports a particular award is one of retribution or punishment, it follows that the
reasons for sustaining the award also apply-with equal force-as a
persuasive justification for not allowing the tortfeasor to shift responsibility for paying the judgment to a third party. As long as the
reasons for awarding punitive damages remain, the justification for
such damages 12 militates against the insurability of punitive damages and against interpreting coverage terms to include punitive
damages.
H. Deterrence
Deterrence is one of the principal goals of punitive damages.1 1 3 Punitive damages serve the public interest by encouraging
corporations to keep defective products-especially those that are
damages where a third party sought a substantial amount of punitive damages
($100,000) and a relatively small amount of compensatory damages ($5,000).
Nandorf, 479 N.E.2d at 992. The court stated that, although the insured and insurer shared a common interest in defeating the plaintiff's liability claims, if the
insured were found liable, the insurer's interest would be best served by an award
of minimal compensatory damages and substantial punitive damages. Id.
110. KEETON & WInIss, supra note 7, § 7.6, at 116.
111. When a court sustains a jury's award of punitive damages, the decision
effectively affirms the rationales for the award.
112. Such justifications must be significant in order to warrant the imposition
of penalties in a commercial society that generally does not impose such penalties.
113. In considering this question, it is undoubtedly appropriate to recognize
that both courts and commentators have questioned the efficacy of punitive damages as a means of affecting misconduct. For example, the Georgia Supreme
Court recently reiterated the often-quoted comment by Justice Blackmun in City of
Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 269 (1981). The Georgia Supreme
Court stated: "The other purpose behind punitive damages, the prevention of future misconduct, is likewise not served by allowing those damages against a governmental entity because the 'impact on -the individual tortfeasor of this deterrence in
the air is at best uncertain.' " Martin v. Hospital Auth., 449 S.E.2d 827, 829-30 (Ga.
1994) (quoting City of Newport v. Facts Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 269 (1981)).
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very hazardous-out of the marketplace.1 14 Therefore, in most circumstances, allowing corporations that may be responsible for defective products to avoid the effects of punitive damages through
the acquisition of liability insurance is incompatible with the objective of deterring the type of conduct that justifies such an award. 11 5
In some circumstances, subjecting insurers to the liability of
their insureds for punitive damages might serve the public's interest
in "deterrence." The cost of insurance, as well as the availability of
insurance, undoubtedly can affect the behavior of insureds, including those who are engaged in the manufacture of products. Furthermore, in some contexts insurers directly influence the business
activities of insureds. For example, a significant portion of the premiums collected by insurers providing coverage for the risks associated with the operation of boilers, has been spent on activities
associated with the design and inspection of boilers to ensure that
they do not explode.1 1 6 In some circumstances, there may be reasons to anticipate both that insurers will involve themselves in the
safety of consumer products and that such involvement will be a
reasonably efficient way to increase the level of product safety. In
those situations, a compelling argument exists that the deterrent
function of punitive damages is enhanced by allowing corporations
to purchase coverage for punitive damages arising from product liability claims.
114. Despite the apparent absence of empirical studies of the conduct of enterprises, some practitioners state that the possibility that courts may impose punitive damages is a significant factor that affects corporate decisions about marketing
potentially dangerous products.
115. Professor David Owen observed two decades ago: "By making the flagrant disregard of the public safety costly, the punitive damages remedy converts
the profit motive into a positive force for the promotion of optimal product
safety." Owen, supra note 91, at 1371.
116. A leading insurance expert, Stephen A. Cozen, observed:
The older boiler and machinery carriers were therefore inspectors first
and insurers second (as the name 'Hartford Steam BoilerInspection and
Insurance Company' implies), and, to this day, inspection and engineering services remain one of the most important aspects of this coverage. A
greater portion of the average premium dollar is spent on risk management and loss prevention in boiler and machinery insurance than is the
case with any other type of property insurance coverage. Many boiler and
machinery insureds purchase a policy as much for the carriers' inspection
services as for the indemnification of any loss that may occur. Indeed,
the importance of the inspection services performed by the typical boiler
and machinery insurer is underscored by the fact that many states allow
the insurer's inspections to substitute for those required by law; certification by insurance company engineers is acceptable evidence of compliance with boiler and pressure vessel safety codes.
STEPHEN A. COZEN, INSURING REAL PROPERTY 5-4 (1991).
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Concluding Observations

This symposium focused on the question whether punitive
damages awarded in products liability cases are appropriately
viewed as "poison pills" or "strong medicine." Examining questions
about the insurability of punitive damages from the perspective suggested by the metaphor, the appropriate answer seems clear. On
the one hand, if punitive damages are regarded as "poison pills," it
is inappropriate to administer them to liability insurance companies. While there undoubtedly are some who might want to prescribe such a lethal prescription to individual insurance companies,
and perhaps even to the entire insurance industry, such action-if
warranted-certainly should not be done indirectly through products liability litigation. On the other hand, if punitive damages are
regarded as an essential, though strong, medication in almost all
circumstances administering the therapy to one or more associates
of the patient-the insurance companies providing layers of liability coverage-affords no prospect for successful treatment. 117
Turning from the metaphorical to the teachings provided by
almost a century of judicial decisions, the justifications that have
been articulated by judges in other contexts are either inapplicable
or relatively unpersuasive as rationales for deciding that liability insurance policies should be interpreted by courts to provide coverage for punitive damages awarded against businesses responsible
for defective products." 8 The reasons articulated by courts for sustaining indemnification claims by insureds provide little, if any, support for resolving questions about whether liability insurance
provides coverage for punitive damages to indemnify enterprisestypically corporations operated by persons with considerable sophistication about both bu3iness practices and insurance coverages-responsible for injuries caused by defective products.
The public's compelling interest in safe products would be
well-served if the prospect of liability for punitive damages influences the conduct of even a few manufacturers. And there is substantial evidence-albeit much of it anecdotal-that the officers
and directors of business enterprises are influenced by the possibility that punitive damages may be imposed."l 9 Moreover, this is an
117. The insurer receiving such medication is analogous to a member of a
group of children who is punished despite the fact that the adult is unable to
discern who among the group is at fault.
118. Nevertheless, as suggested above, continuing to hold that punitive damages are insurable could prove to be a prophylactic device in some contexts.
119. Cf Ellis, supra note 6, at 74 ("Insurability of punitive damages also conflicts with the goal of efficient deterrence. Insurance reduces incentives to engage
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area where the criminal laws are rarely, if ever, the basis for the
imposition of sanctions on either corporations or on corporate officers and directors. In the absence of criminal sanctions, civil remedies-including punitive damages-can be and have become a
significant means of influencing conduct. Therefore, on balancewhen the question of coverage for punitive damages is left for
courts to resolve-I believe enhancing the public safety is the consideration upon which courts should predicate decisions that punitive damages awarded as a result of defective products are not
covered by liability insurance.
The public's interest in safe products also provides a cogent
and compelling rationale for legislative actions that would preclude
insurers from providing coverage in liability insurance policies for
punitive damages awarded against businesses responsible for defective products. Experiences with products that have caused horrendous harms during the past two or three decades seem to clearly
indicate that some enterprises have put products into the marketplace knowing that although the item could be designed so as to
afford greater safety for the public, the costs of doing so were
greater than the projected harms. Hopefully, future hazards will be
reduced if manufacturers are forced to factor in possible liability
for punitive damages that they could not shift to insurance
companies.
in loss avoidance and, in the case of wrongs falling within the categories of malice
and reckless conduct ... increases moral hazard.").
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